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Foreword 
According to the Minerals Council of Australia, our country possesses 30 per cent 
of the known global reserves of uranium ore.   
Australia can become the world leader in supplying fuel for low-carbon emission 
base load electrical power in rapidly expanding economies looking to secure their 
energy needs while limiting greenhouse gas emissions. 
One of the largest of the rapidly developing economies is India. 
The Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, can double the size of Australia’s 
nuclear mining sector.  In terms of export income, it could add up to $1.75b to the 
Australian economy.  It could increase the number employed in uranium mining 
from 4,000 at present to 8,000. 
Contributors to the inquiry identified excellent opportunities for employment and 
export income in South Australia and Western Australia. There are also potential 
benefits to Queensland should uranium mining recommence in that state. 
The Indian Government is planning an exponential growth in electricity 
generation from a base of 408kWh per capita per year in 2001 to 5,300kWh per 
capita per year in 2052. 
India is using a spectrum of low-carbon emission technologies to generate this 
additional power, with nuclear power playing an important part.  India will need 
access to a reliable and consistent supply or uranium if it is to achieve this growth. 
While there are considerable benefits for both parties, negotiating a nuclear 
cooperation agreement with India presents some significant risks.  The question 
for the Committee is, then, can the risks be tolerated and ameliorated? 
There are three areas of risk associated with the Agreement. 
The first is the risk to nuclear non-proliferation. As India is not a signatory to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it exists in isolation from the nuclear non-
proliferation mainstream.  However, it is not realistic to expect India to renounce 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons and dismantle its nuclear arsenal India 
borders two other nuclear weapons states with which it is occasionally in conflict.  
viii 
The agreement represents a different approach to non-proliferation in India; using 
engagement to bring India into the nuclear non-proliferation mainstream. 
The Committee agrees with this approach, but believes that only genuine non-
proliferation advances on India’s part will ameliorate the potential risk to the non-
proliferation framework.  Consequently, the Committee has made 
recommendations encouraging the Australian Government to engage in a 
diplomatic effort to produce genuine non-proliferation advances from India. 
The second area of risk relates to the regulation of India’s nuclear facilities.  Both 
the Auditor-General of India and the International Atomic Energy Commission 
have identified a number of weaknesses in the regulatory framework that 
jeopardise nuclear safety and security. 
The Committee has made a recommendation that the sale of uranium to India only 
commence when these weaknesses have been addressed. 
The final area of risk concerns the provisions of the Agreement.  A number of the 
provisions were debated in considerable detail. The Committee was satisfied that 
the bulk of concerns have been addressed. 
In particular, in relation to accounting for Australian nuclear materials in India, 
the Committee reached a position where it trusts that Australian nuclear material 
in India can be accounted for and tracked. 
The Committee identified two unresolved issues relating to the provisions of the 
Agreement; the terminology used in the consent mechanism for the refinement of 
nuclear materials, and the question of whether the proposed Agreement breaches 
the Treaty of Rarotonga.  In both cases, the Committee was faced with opposing 
interpretations presented by reputable sources.  The Committee has recommended 
that the outline of the Australian Government’s legal advice on these matters be 
included in the Government Response to the Report. 
The Committee took the time to fully consider the issues raised by this Agreement, 
and has reached a view that, provided the recommended steps are taken as part of 
the implementation of the Agreement, it can be ratified and the benefits realised. 
Mr Wyatt Roy MP 
Chair 
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The Resolution of Appointment of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties 
allows it to inquire into and report on: 
a) matters arising from treaties and related National Interest Analyses and
proposed treaty actions and related Explanatory Statements presented or
deemed to be presented to the Parliament;
b) any question relating to a treaty or other international instrument, whether
or not negotiated to completion, referred to the committee by:
(i) either House of the Parliament, or
(ii) a Minister; and
(iii) such other matters as may be referred to the committee by the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and on such conditions as the Minister 
may prescribe. 
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List of recommendations 
4 Nuclear non-proliferation
Recommendation 1 
The Committee urges the Australian Government to commit significant 
diplomatic resources to encouraging India to become a party to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to negotiate a fissile material cut-off 
treaty. 
Recommendation 2 
The Committee recommends the Australian Government considers 
facilitating the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty for the 
Indian subcontinent region.  Such a treaty could feasibly have an initial 
goal of preventing the development of thermonuclear weapons by India 
and Pakistan, and prevent the deployment of such weapons to the region 
by China. 
5 Nuclear safety in India
Recommendation 3 
Committee recommends that, should the Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy be ratified, uranium sales to India only 
commence when the following conditions are met: 
 India has achieved the full separation of civil and military nuclear
facilities as verified by the IAEA; 
 India has established an independent nuclear regulatory authority
under law; 
 the Indian nuclear regulator’s existing policies and arrangements
have been reviewed to ensure its independence; 
xiv 
 the frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of onsite
inspections at nuclear facilities have been verified by the IAEA as being 
best practice standard; and 
 the lack of sufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear
facilities has been rectified. 
6 Specific provisions
Recommendation 4 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government outline the 
legal advice it has received regarding the consent to reprocessing 
provisions in Article VI of the proposed Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 
7 Concluding remarks
Recommendation 5 
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government outline the 
legal advice it has received concerning whether the proposed Agreement 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy breaches Australia’s 
obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. 
Recommendation 6 
Subject to the above recommendations, the Committee supports the 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India 
on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and recommends that 
binding treaty action be taken. 
1 
Conduct of the Inquiry 
1.1 The proposed Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 
proposed Agreement) was tabled in the Australian Parliament on 
28 October 2014. 
1.2 It has taken the Committee considerably longer than the allotted 20 sitting 
days to complete the inquiry.  There are compelling reasons for this. 
1.3 The most obvious of these is the basic intent of the proposed Agreement – 
the sale of Australian nuclear material to India, a state that is not a party to 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that is armed with nuclear 
weapons. 
1.4 Another reason for the time taken to complete this inquiry has been the 
participation of some of the most experienced and incisive minds in the 
non-proliferation and strategic issues communities, both in Australia and 
abroad. 
1.5 Attracting such a wealth of knowledge has resulted in the consideration of 
a number of very complex issues, many of which needed careful 
examination. 
1.6 The Committee would like to take this opportunity to thank all 
participants to the inquiry for their conscientious, patient and valuable 
assistance with the inquiry. 
1.7 The issues that have emerged from the evidence are examined in the six 
following Chapters: 
 Chapter two examines the potential benefits for Australia and India
should the proposed Agreement be ratified;
 Chapter three provides an overview of the proposed Agreement and its
provisions;
 Chapter four  examines the strategic and non-proliferation issues
arising out of the proposed Agreement;
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 Chapter five deals with nuclear safety in India;
 Chapter six works through issues related to the specific provisions of
the proposed Agreement; and
 Chapter seven makes some concluding remarks.
Nuclear power 
1.8 The Report discusses some complex matters relating to nuclear power.  To 
assist with these discussions, it is worth providing a brief overview of the 
mechanics of nuclear power electricity generation. 
1.9 Nuclear reactors used to generate electricity use a process called nuclear 
fission. 
1.10 Nuclear fission involves the destruction of radioactive uranium and 
plutonium atoms, which generates heat and the formation of other 
radioactive elements, such as caesium, strontium and iodine.  The heat 
from the process, which constitutes about a third of the energy generated 
by fission, is used to heat water to steam, which is then used to drive an 
electricity generator turbine.1 
1.11 Uranium in its natural form is uranium oxide, often called ‘yellowcake’.  
In this form it is mined in order to produce nuclear fuel.  The uranium in 
uranium oxide is generally of two types: the more common, stable, 
uranium 238 and the less common, radioactive, uranium 235. Uranium 238 
usually comprises 99.3 per cent of naturally occurring uranium.2   
1.12 The numbers 238 and 235 refer to the atomic weight of the element. In 
simple terms, this refers to the number of subatomic particles (protons and 
neutrons) that make up the nucleus of the element. The higher the atomic 
weight of the element, the larger and heavier it is.3 
1.13 There are a number of steps involved in turning uranium oxide into 
nuclear fuel.  The first is to refine the fuel to increase the concentration of 
uranium 235 to between three and five percent of the uranium.  At this 
1  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
2  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
3  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
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concentration, there is sufficient uranium 235 to commence a fission 
reaction.4 
1.14 Refining the nuclear fuel involves first removing the oxide from the 
uranium, then concentrating (called ‘enriching’) the uranium 235.5 
1.15 Enrichment is undertaken by making use of the difference in weight 
between uranium 235 and uranium 238.  The most common technique 
involves spinning the uranium in a centrifuge.  The heavier uranium 238 
will migrate to the outer edge of the centrifuge while the lighter uranium 
235 will remain in the centre, separating the radioactive and the stable 
uranium.  The excess uranium 238 is called depleted uranium and has a 
number of uses unrelated to nuclear power generation based on its 
weight.6 
1.16 The enriched uranium is then manufactured into fuel pellets, which are 
combined into rods.  Fuel rods are then combined into fuel assemblies. 
Most nuclear reactors use between 150 – 200 assemblies.7 
1.17 The Committee has already heard evidence from the Australian 
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office that, should India purchase 
uranium ore from Australia, the uranium will be exported to the United 
States to be processed into fuel assemblies before being exported to India 
for use.8 
1.18 Nuclear fuel that has undergone fission is called ‘spent fuel’.  The spent 
fuel assemblies are first stored in water to contain any residual heat and 
radioactivity.9 
1.19 Following storage, spent fuel assemblies can be reprocessed to extract 
plutonium created during fission, and any uranium that has not been 
consumed.  The extracted uranium and plutonium, both which can be 
4  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
5  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
6  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015.  The most common use for depleted uranium is shielding on 
radiographic medical equipment. 
7   US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
8  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 
2015, p. 3. 
9  US Department of Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle, < http://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-fuel-
cycle >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
4 REPORT 151: TREATY TABLED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
used as nuclear fuel, are fed back into the fuel production process to be 
included in new fuel assemblies.10 
1.20 The waste products from reprocessing are highly radioactive, and require 
special treatment.  In general these waste products are sealed into glass 
and then into steel canisters.  At present the steel canisters are stored 
behind shielding pending final disposal, which, according the Australian 
Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, will need to involve burial 
in stable geological formations deep underground.11 
The inquiry process 
1.21 The Committee’s resolution of appointment empowers it to inquire into 
any treaty to which Australia has become signatory, on the treaty being 
tabled in Parliament.  
1.22 The treaties, and matters arising from them, are evaluated to ensure that 
ratification is in the national interest, and that unintended or negative 
effects on Australians will not arise. 
1.23 Prior to tabling, major treaty actions are subject to a National Interest 
Analysis (NIA), prepared by Government. This document considers 
arguments for and against the treaty, outlines the treaty obligations and 
any regulatory or financial implications, and reports the results of 
consultations undertaken with State and Territory Governments, Federal 
and State and Territory agencies, and with industry or non-government 
organisations. 
1.24 The Committee takes account of these documents in its examination of the 
treaty text, in addition to other evidence taken during the inquiry 
program. 
1.25 Copies of this treaty and its associated documentation may be obtained 
from the Committee Secretariat or accessed through the Committee’s 
website at: 
 http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/
Treaties/28_October_2014
10  Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 
<http://www.ansto.gov.au/NuclearFacts/ManagingRadioActiveWaste/Thenuclearfuelcycle
/index.htm  >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
11  ANSTO, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 
<http://www.ansto.gov.au/NuclearFacts/ManagingRadioActiveWaste/Thenuclearfuelcycle
/index.htm  >, viewed on 14 April 2015. 
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Conduct of the Committee’s review 
1.26 The treaty action reviewed in this report was advertised on the 
Committee’s website from the date of tabling. Submissions for the treaty 
were requested by 28 November 2014. 
1.27 Invitations were made to all State Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and 
to the Presiding Officers of each Parliament to lodge submissions. The 
Committee also invited submissions from individuals and organisations 
with an interest in the particular treaty under review. 
1.28 The Committee held four public hearing as part of this inquiry: 
 9 February 2015 in Canberra;
 12 February 2015 in Canberra;
 18 May 2015 in Melbourne; and
 15 June 2015 in Canberra.
1.29 The transcripts of evidence from the public hearing may be obtained from 
the Committee Secretariat or accessed through the Committee’s website 
under the treaty’s tabling date, 28 October 2014. 
1.30 A list of submissions received and their authors is at Appendix A. 
1.31 A list of witnesses who appeared at the public hearing is at Appendix B. 
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2 
The benefits for Australia and India 
2.1 This Chapter discusses the potential benefits of the proposed Agreement 
for Australia and India. 
2.2 The proposed Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology 
(the proposed Agreement) if ratified, will be part of India’s efforts to 
overcome its energy poverty through the expansion of electricity 
generation. 
2.3 In principle, the export of Australian uranium to India will result in 
significant benefits to both Australia and India. 
2.4 Australia has large reserves of uranium ore and a number of mining 
companies keen to exploit this resource, with resulting jobs and export 
revenues.  India has a large population, a lack of electrical generating 
capacity, and a commitment to tackle the problem.  India does not have a 
significant domestic supply of uranium, so must obtain it internationally.1 
The benefits 
2.5 India’s plan to expand electricity generation over the next few decades 
will, according to the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA): 
… deliver significant economic benefits to Australia. Australia is 
home to almost a third of the world's uranium resources, and 
India promises to be one of several growing markets for uranium 
fuel for nuclear power. 2 
1  Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Submission 9, p. 1. 
2  Dr Vanessa Guthrie, Board Member, Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 13. 
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2.6 India does not have sufficient domestic uranium reserves to meet its 
demands for nuclear fuel, and currently sources its uranium from 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, predominantly.3 
2.7 Should India’s nuclear power generated electricity sector expand as 
expected, India will be dependent on uranium imports, providing a 
reliable long term income stream for Australia’s uranium exporters.4 The 
MCA believes that Australia could provide up to one third of the uranium 
India will require into the future.5 
2.8 In terms of the size of this market: 
… Australian uranium sales to India by 2030 could be between
1,000 and 2,000 tonnes, worth between $100 million and $225 
million in export earnings. The total additional revenue through to 
2030 could be between $750 million up to $1.5 billion to the 
Australian economy. 6 
2.9 By way of comparison, according to the MCA, the uranium mining sector 
in Australia earned $622 million in 2013.7 
2.10 In specific terms, the sale of uranium to India is likely to facilitate an 
estimated increase in capacity from the established uranium mines in 
South Australia.  The South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy 
claims that capacity in South Australia could increase to 17,500 tonnes of 
ore, worth $1.4 billion in revenue.8 
2.11 In Western Australia, the sale would support the establishment of a new 
mining industry, with four mines under regulatory consideration at 
present.9  One of these is located at Wiluna, 1,000km north of Perth.  The 
company involved, Toro Energy, expects that, should the mine be 
approved, it will have a life span of 20 years and will produce 1,200 tonnes 
of uranium oxide concentrate per year.10 
2.12 One of the advantages Toro Energy considers will arise from the proposed 
mine is a generation’s worth of jobs, income and business opportunities 
for the local Wiluna community.11 
3  Dr Guthrie, MCA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 13. 
4  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 
2015, p. 1. 
5  Dr Guthrie, MCA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 13. 
6  Dr Guthrie, MCA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 13. 
7  Dr Guthrie, MCA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 14. 
8  South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy, Submission 18, p. 1. 
9  Western Australian Chamber of Minerals and Energy, Submission 19, p. 2. 
10  Toro Energy, Submission 17, p. 2. 
11  Toro Energy, Submission 17, p. 2. 
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2.13 The Queensland Government introduced a ban on uranium mining in 
March 2015. The Queensland mining industry may not be in a position to 
benefit from the increase in uranium sales should the proposed Treaty be 
ratified.  The Queensland uranium mining industry has estimated that the 
ban has prevented the extraction of $6 billion in uranium ore.12 
2.14 Across Australia, the sale of uranium to India is expected to significantly 
increase employment in the uranium mining sector, with jobs being 
created particularly in rural and regional areas.  In 2013, the MCA 
estimated that there were 4,200 jobs in uranium mining in Australia.  
Should the sale of uranium to India go ahead, the MCA expects that the 
number of those employed will nearly double to 8,000.13 
Electricity generating capacity in India 
2.15 India is the fourth largest energy consumer in the world.14  However, 
India also has one of lowest levels of per capita energy consumption in the 
world.15 The problems that characterise India’s electricity supply include: 
 rolling blackouts as a result of a lack of generating capacity;
 404 million people (30 per cent of the population) without access to any
electrical supply;16 and
 a predicted rise in demand for electrical supply of 70 per cent between
2012 and 2020.17
2.16 In 2001, electricity consumption in India was 408kWh18 per capita a year 
compared to the OECD average of 7,879kWh per capita a year.19 Further, 
India’s per capita consumption is one fifth of China’s.20 
2.17 To provide some sense of the amount of per capita electricity available to 
people in India, 408kWh a year is enough to run a refrigerator for eight 
months out of every twelve.21 
12  Australian Mining, 18 March 2015, ‘Investor Confidence Shaken after QLD Mining Ban’, 
<http://www.miningaustralia.com.au/news/investor-confidence-shaken-after-qld-uranium-
minin>, viewed 11 August 2015. 
13  Dr Guthrie, MCA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 14. 
14  MCA, Submission 9, p. 1. 
15  Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy, Strategy for Growth of Electricity in India – 
Introduction, <http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/124>, viewed 20 January 2015. 
16  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 1. 
17  MCA, Submission 9, p. 2. 
18  kWh (kilowatt hours) is a measure of electrical usage over time. 
19  Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy, Strategy for Growth of Electricity in India – 
Introduction, <http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/124>, viewed 20 January 2015. 
20  Mr John Carlson, Submission 1, p. 1. 
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2.18 Coal power stations generate one half of India’s electricity. Other sources 
of power include:  hydroelectric power (16 per cent), other renewables 
(12.7 per cent), natural gas (9 per cent), and nuclear (1.9 per cent).22 
2.19 In addition, India’s electrical grid losses are very high at over 23 per cent 
of generated electricity.23 The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and 
International Commission, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania notes that 
India could achieve its energy objectives to the year 2020 by improving the 
efficiency of the electricity grid alone.24 
2.20 The Indian Government believes that Indian electricity consumption per 
capita will increase to 5,300kWh per year in 2052, with a large contribution 
coming from nuclear power.25  India’s energy policy is aimed at securing 
adequate energy supplies to meet this demand.26 
2.21 According to Crispin Rovere: 
For India, nuclear power supports broader efforts to lift hundreds 
of millions of people out of abject poverty. 27 
2.22 The Indian Government is prioritising nuclear power generated electricity 
over coal.  Compared to coal, nuclear power results in insignificant carbon 
emissions. If the projected increase in nuclear generating capacity were 
met by coal, it would result in over 300 million metric tonnes of carbon 
dioxide emissions a year.28 
Increasing nuclear generation 
2.23 India’s civilian nuclear program was established in 1954, with the creation 
of the Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy and Atomic 
21  Government of the United States of America, Department of Energy, Energy Saver: Household 
Appliances, <http://energy.gov/energysaver/articles/tips-appliances>, viewed 17 June 2015. 
22  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 1. 
23  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 1. 
24  The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International Commission, Synod of Victoria and 
Tasmania, Submission 8, p. 6. 
25  Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy, Strategy for Growth of Electricity in India – 
Electricity Demand Projection, <http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/128>, viewed 
20 January 2015. 
26  MCA, Submission 9, p. 1. 
27  Mr Crispin Rovere, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 7. 
28  United States Energy Information Administration, Carbon Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, 
<http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/co2_article/co2.html>, viewed on 21 July 
2015; and the European Nuclear Fuel Society, Fuel Comparison, 
<https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/f/fuelcomparison.htm>, viewed on 
21 July 2015. 
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Energy Commission.  Civilian nuclear reactors are run by a Government 
owned enterprise, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India.29 
2.24 The World Nuclear Association indicates that India is anticipating 
supplying 25 per cent of its electrical power through nuclear power 
generation by 2050, which represents a more than 600 per cent increase.  
India’s nuclear reactors supplied 5.3 GW30 of electricity in 2014.  This is 
projected to increase to 1,094 GW in 2050.31  By way of comparison, this is 
ten times the current installed nuclear capacity of the United States.32 
2.25 The increase will require the construction on average of seven reactors 
every year from now until 2050.33 
2.26 By 2025 the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) 
believes that India's uranium import requirement should grow to around 
2,000 tonnes of uranium oxide each year valued at about $200 million.34 
2.27 Given the size of the Indian population and the anticipated increase in per 
capita demand, Crispin Rovere argues that a failure on India’s part to 
meet its nuclear power electricity generation target will result in that 
demand being met through coal power generation, with resulting 
increases in greenhouse gas emissions of a scale sufficient to impact global 
levels of greenhouse gasses.35 
2.28 In fact, if India were to use coal to generate the quantum of electricity 
planned to be generated by nuclear power, this would conservatively 
produce 315 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions a year.36 
2.29 None of the participants in the inquiry advocated coal as an alternative to 
nuclear power for India’s energy demands. The Australian Conservation 
Foundation (ACF) summarised the general view: 
...Coal is cheap and nasty. It is effective. It generates power. India 
now is overwhelmingly coal dependent. So yes: for unit price, it 
would be cheaper. In the long run, it is absolutely not going to be 
29  Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy, About us, 
<http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/634>, viewed 20 January 2015. 
30  GW refers to Gigawatts, a measure of electrical generation. 
31  MCA, Submission 9, p. 2. 
32  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 1. 
33  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 1. 
34  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 1. 
35  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 5. 
36  Calculated using figures from the United States Energy Information Administration, Carbon 
Dioxide Emission Factors for Coal, 
<http://www.eia.gov/coal/production/quarterly/co2_article/co2.html>, viewed on 21 July 
2015; and the European Nuclear Fuel Society, Fuel Comparison, 
<https://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/f/fuelcomparison.htm>, viewed on 
21 July 2015. 
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cheaper, because it is a massive contributor to greenhouse 
pollution, to particulate pollution, to asthma and to all sorts of 
things. It is a massive fast-tracker of climate change, and many of 
the plants are old and will need to be retired. They do not have the 
capacity to upgrade to meet what are ambitious energy production 
targets. 37 
Opposition to uranium exports 
2.30 A number of participants to the inquiry are strongly opposed to the export 
of Australian uranium to India.  Amongst those opposed are: Friends of 
the Earth;38 the ACF;39 the Uniting Church of Australia Justice and 
International Commission;40 the Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation;41 
and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(Australia).42 
2.31 Participants opposed to the export of uranium argue that it is unnecessary 
to export uranium to India because India has a large and thriving 
renewable energy sector that could meet the expected demand for power 
in India.43  For example, ACF argues: 
…There is no question that, while the Indian government is 
pursuing nuclear expansion, it is also assertively pursuing 
renewable energy development. We would strongly say that that 
is the way to go and that is the path to prioritise and take. There 
are 50,000 solar technicians being trained now in India. The Modi 
government, according to Bloomberg of March this year, is 
planning a $200 billion investment. It is the seventh-largest clean 
energy investor in the world. 44 
2.32 The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International Commission 
argues: 
37  Mr Dave Sweeney, Nuclear Free Campaigner, Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), 
Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 15. 
38  Friends of the Earth (FoE), Submission 14, p. 1. 
39  Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), Submission 5, p. 1. 
40  The Uniting Church, Submission 8, p. 1. 
41  Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation, Submission 12, p. 1. 
42  International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Australia), Submission 10, p. 1. 
43  The Uniting Church, Submission 8, p. 7. 
44  Mr Sweeney, ACF,, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 15. 
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India is able to double its generation from renewable energy from 
25 gigawatts to 55 gigawatts by 2017. They believe that is possible, 
although ambitious.  
2.33 The Uniting Church cited modelling conducted by the International 
Energy Agency showing that there can be a fourfold increase in energy 
production by 2050, with fossil fuel use falling from 80 per cent of energy 
needs to 25 per cent.45 
2.34 Renewable energy sources are, according to the Uniting Church, also 
better placed to provide power to the 400 million Indians without access to 
the electricity grid: 
… one of the issues of India's vast size is actually getting electricity 
to the people who need it. Often, therefore, locally produced 
resources are needed. Certainly, to meet the needs of that [400] 
million, a significant part will be locally generated power, as 
opposed to centrally generated by things like nuclear power 
stations. 46 
Conclusion 
2.35 From Australia’s perspective, selling uranium to India would double the 
size of an export industry, both in terms of income and employment 
opportunities.  Moreover, it will do so in regional and remote Australia at 
a time when lower commodity prices are having an economic impact on 
these regions. 
2.36 India’s proposed expansion in electricity generating capacity of all types is 
prodigious to say the least.  While a number of participants to the inquiry 
doubt that India has the capacity to undertake such an expansion, the 
Indian public, who generally consider themselves citizens of an emerging 
world power, are unlikely to settle for an average electricity supply per 
capita that does not run a fridge, let alone lighting, hot water and other 
utilities that together are considered to constitute to a reasonable standard 
of living. 
2.37 The evidence presented to the Committee shows that the Indian 
Government is well aware of the significance of keeping greenhouse gas 
emissions to a minimum while increasing electricity supply.  It is clear 
from the evidence presented that the Indian Government has as great a 
commitment to renewable energy as it does to nuclear energy. 
45  Dr Mark Zirnsak, Director, Justice and International Mission, Uniting Church of Australia, 
Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 2. 
46  Dr Zirnsak, Uniting Church, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 2. 
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2.38 Nevertheless, the Indian Government considers that a spectrum of energy 
sources will be necessary to meet the expected demand for electricity from 
the 400 million Indians without access to the electricity grid, and nuclear 
energy is a part of that spectrum. 
2.39 Regardless of the quantum of India’s future energy needs met by 
renewables, the evidence indicates that part of the projected increase in 
electricity generation will be met by either nuclear power or coal.  Of those 
two generating options, nuclear is clearly the better.  It will at least reduce, 
if not eliminate, the measurable increase in greenhouse gas emissions that 
would result from the use of coal. 
2.40 In principle, therefore, the Committee supports the sale of uranium to 
India. 
2.41 The Committee will now examine the Agreement in detail. 
3 
The Agreement 
Background 
3.1 The proposed Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 
proposed Agreement) is intended to permit the export of Australian 
uranium to India and create reciprocal obligations regarding the 
application of safeguards and physical security to the transfer and use of 
nuclear and associated material.1 
3.2 This Chapter contains a description of the proposed Agreement, and will 
feed into the discussion of the issues arising out of the Agreement, 
particularly in Chapter 6 of the Report, which will deal with some of the 
specific provisions of the proposed Agreement. 
3.3 According to the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office 
(ASNO): 
Australia has looked at the issue of uranium sales to India on a 
number of occasions. In the latter part of the Howard government, 
the then government made a decision that it would be willing to 
pursue nuclear cooperation with India. In the Rudd government, 
that decision was then reversed and the important steps leading 
up to where we are now was that, in December of 2011, the ALP 
National Conference changed their policy, thus supporting the 
possibility of uranium sales to India. The Gillard government then, 
in October of 2012, announced the commencement of negotiations. 
The first negotiations were held on 19 March 2013 and have 
1  National Interest Analysis, [2014] ATNIA 22, Agreement between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [2014] ATNIF 26, 
(hereafter referred to as the NIA), para 3. 
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continued on for the treaty, the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
as well as the administrative arrangement since then. So that has 
gone across a couple of governments. 2 
3.4 The Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) is also keen to emphasise the 
fact that the negotiations for the proposed Agreement have been 
authorised by both Coalition and Australian Labor Party Governments: 
Putting in place the nonproliferation infrastructure to facilitate 
uranium sales to India comes with bipartisan support. The 
agreement has been several years in the making, and we commend 
the former government as well as the current Abbott government 
for delivering this agreement.3 
The Agreement 
3.5 The proposed Agreement recognises India’s commitment to the 
development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with a view 
to achieving sustainable development and strengthening energy security 
including fuel reserves, and the role Australia could play as a long term 
reliable supplier of uranium to India.4 
3.6 The proposed Agreement also notes that the parties share common 
concerns and objectives regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and their delivery systems.5 
3.7 The preamble states: 
… UNDERLINING their shared belief that international 
cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
should be consistent with the objectives of non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and with the respective international obligations 
of states; …6 
2  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
15 June 2015, p. 3. 
3  Dr Vanessa Guthrie, Board Member, Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 14. 
4  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [2014] ATNIF26 (hereafter referred to as the proposed 
Agreement), preamble. 
5  The proposed Agreement, preamble. 
6  The proposed Agreement, preamble. 
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3.8 The preamble also affirms the signatories’ support for the objectives of the 
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).7 
3.9 The National Interest Analysis (NIA) points out that Australia’s nuclear 
cooperation agreements, while broadly similar, do vary according to the 
requirements of each case, including whether the other party is a signatory 
of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Specifically, the NIA 
claims: 
The provisions of the proposed Agreement would implement 
Australia’s policies for the safeguarding and accountability of 
supplied nuclear materials for the case of India.8 
3.10 Article II of the proposed Agreement defines cooperation in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy in the following terms: 
 the supply of uranium;
 the production and application of radioisotopes and radiation in
industry, agriculture, medicine and the environment;
 nuclear safety, radiation and environment protection and management
of radioactive waste;
 safe, secure, sustainable safeguarded use of civil nuclear energy,
including regulatory and technological advancements; and
 any other areas of cooperation to be determined in writing between the
parties.9
3.11 The proposed Agreement foreshadows cooperation taking the following 
forms: 
 the supply of:
⇒ nuclear materials, non-nuclear materials, equipment, components
and technology;
⇒ equipment produced by the application of transferred technology;
⇒ nuclear material and non-nuclear material produced by the
transferred equipment or technology; and
⇒ nuclear material that is produced or processed by the use of any
nuclear material or non-nuclear material subject to the proposed
Agreement;
 exchange and training of personnel;
 organisation of symposia and seminars;
 provision of relevant technical assistance and services;
7  The proposed Agreement, preamble. 
8  NIA, para 14. 
9  The proposed Agreement, Article II. 
18 REPORT 151: TREATY TABLED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
 the exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation;
 joint research and development of projects; and
 other forms of cooperation determined in writing by the parties.10
3.12 Cooperation in a field specified in Article II would be carried out 
following a written arrangement between the parties.11 
3.13 The materials subject to the proposed Agreement remain subject to it until: 
 if it is nuclear material, the material has been consumed or diluted in
such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant
from the point of view of safeguards, or has become irrecoverable; or
 in the case of all material, it has been transferred beyond the control of
Australia or India in accordance with Article IX of the proposed
Agreement; or
 the parties mutually agree in writing that the material should no longer
be subject to the proposed Agreement.12
3.14 The proposed Agreement is to be implemented through authorities 
designated by the parties.  For Australia, the designated authority is 
ASNO.  For India, the designated authority is the Nuclear Controls and 
Planning Wing of the Department of Atomic Energy.13   
3.15 Each party to the proposed Agreement will maintain a system of 
accounting for and control of items subject to the proposed Agreement.14  
Such items will only be transferred to entities that have been authorised 
by the receiving party’s designated authority.15 
3.16 The proposed Agreement foreshadows visits of experts to the respective 
territories of the parties for the implementation of the Agreement.16 
3.17 Agreement states that India will be permitted to process nuclear material 
subject to the proposed Agreement in facilities meeting IAEA safeguards 
detailed in the Arrangements and Procedures Agreed between the United States 
of America and the Government of India pursuant to Article 6(iii) of their 
Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.17 
3.18 The processed material can only continue to be used  as long as the IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement with the United States remains in force, and any 
10  The proposed Agreement, Article II. 
11  The proposed Agreement, Article II. 
12  The proposed Agreement, Article III. 
13  The proposed Agreement, Article III. 
14  The proposed Agreement, Article III. 
15  The proposed Agreement, Article III. 
16  The proposed Agreement, Article V. 
17  The proposed Agreement, Article VI. 
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fissionable material obtained from processing is used by India ‘…under 
Agency safeguards to implement India’s planned nuclear energy 
programme.’18 
3.19 India must notify Australia when it engages in processing, and must 
include information ‘available to the Government of India on the IAEA 
safeguards approaches for the facility that is not classified as safeguards 
confidential’ and a confirmation that the physical protection measures 
required under Article VIII of the proposed Agreement will be applied 
during processing.19 
3.20 Processing material subject to the proposed Agreement can be carried out 
to an enrichment level of less than 20 per cent in the isotope 235 of 
uranium.  Enrichment above this level can be undertaken with Australia’s 
prior consent.20 
3.21 Article VII, which ASNO considers is a key provision of the proposed 
Agreement,21 binds the parties to ensure: 
… that the items subject to this Agreement as well as by-products
are used only for peaceful and non-explosive purposes. 22 
3.22 The requirements of the Agreement between the Government of India and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards to 
Civilian Nuclear Facilities are to apply to all the items subject to the 
proposed Agreement so long as they remain under the jurisdiction or 
control of the parties.  According to the proposed Agreement: 
If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is not 
possible, the Parties shall consult and agree on appropriate 
verification measures. 23 
3.23 Each party shall ensure that adequate physical protection measures are 
applied to items subject to the proposed Agreement. This requirement 
extends to the international carriage of the items.24 
3.24 The parties are required in their physical protection measures to meet the 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 
recommendations of the IAEA publication ‘Nuclear Security 
18  The proposed Agreement, Article VI. 
19  The proposed Agreement, Article VI. 
20  The proposed Agreement, Article VI. 
21  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 7. 
22  The proposed Agreement, Article VII. 
23  The proposed Agreement, Article VII. 
24  The proposed Agreement, Article VIII. 
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Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear 
Facilities.’25 
3.25 Items subject to the proposed Agreement will not be transferred beyond 
the jurisdiction or control of the recipient party without the prior consent 
of the supplying party, except: 
 where the recipient party has received assurances from the third state to
which the items are being transferred that IAEA safeguards and
physical security protections are in place; and
 where the parties keep and exchange lists of third parties to which
transfers have occurred and the nuclear fuel cycle processes that may be
applied to the transferred items.26
3.26 Dispute settlement under the proposed Agreement will take place through 
negotiation between the parties.27 
3.27 The proposed Agreement can be terminated with 12 months’ notice.  The 
proposed Agreement states: 
Unless otherwise mutually determined in writing between the 
Parties, termination or suspension of this Agreement or any 
cooperation under it for any reason shall not release the Parties 
from obligations under Articles III, VI, VII, VIII, IX and X of this 
Agreement in respect of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, 
equipment, components and technology transferred while the 
Agreement is in force.28 
Differences with other Nuclear Cooperation Agreements 
3.28 The proposed Agreement differs from other nuclear cooperation 
agreements to which Australia is a party.  The most recent of these is the 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the 
United Arab Emirates on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, on 
which the Committee reported in March 2014.29  This United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) Agreement will be used as a comparison to identify points 
of difference. 
25  The proposed Agreement, Article VIII. 
26  The proposed Agreement, Article IX. 
27  The proposed Agreement, Article XII. 
28  The proposed Agreement, Article XIV. 
29  Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), Report 137, tabled 
18 March 2014. 
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3.29 The following are the key differences between the two agreements: 
 the proposed Agreement specifically does not apply to nuclear
materials developed independent of the proposed Agreement;
 the proposed Agreement permits reprocessing and enrichment to less
than 20 per cent in the isotope 235 of uranium, with enrichment above
this level undertaken with Australia’s prior consent, while the UAE
Agreement does not permit reprocessing;
 in the event of material non-compliance with IAEA standards, the UAE
Agreement requires the return of Australian nuclear material, while
there is no provision for material non-compliance in the proposed
Agreement; and
 the proposed Agreement contains an Article applying key provisions of
the Agreement to Australian nuclear materials even if the Agreement is
terminated.
3.30 Having described the proposed Agreement’s provisions, the Report will 
now turn to issues associated with nuclear non-proliferation. 
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4 
Nuclear non-proliferation 
4.1 In general, aside from inquiry participants with an in-principle opposition 
to the use of nuclear power, concerns about the proposed Agreement 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the proposed Agreement) 
fall into one of three categories: 
 India’s position as one of the handful of known nuclear weapons states
that are not signatory to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
 the quality of safety and regulation of India’s nuclear industry; and
 concerns about specific provisions in the proposed Agreement.
4.2 This Chapter will examine the issues associated with India’s nuclear non-
proliferation record in detail, and the following chapters will deal in detail 
with each of the other categories of concern. 
4.3 India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 using plutonium from a 
Canadian supplied nuclear reactor in contravention of the Canada-India 
Reactor Agreement 1956.1  India is estimated to possess between 90 and 110 
nuclear warheads.2 
4.4 India is one of three nuclear weapons states that have not signed the NPT.  
The other nations are Israel and Pakistan.3  India, Israel and Pakistan are 
not party to the NPT because the NPT cannot be ratified by a nuclear 
armed state that conducted its first nuclear weapons test after 
1  Mr John Carlson, Submission 1, p 10. 
2  Arms Control Association, Nuclear Weapons, Who Has What at a Glance, 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>, viewed 
2 February 2015. 
3  Arms Control Association, Nuclear Weapons, Who Has What at a Glance, 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>, viewed 
2 February 2015. North Korea is a signatory to the NPT, but has withdrawn from the Treaty. 
North Korea is believed to have a small number of nuclear weapons. 
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1 January 1967.  In practical terms, India can only ratify the NPT if it 
disposes of its nuclear weapons.4 
4.5 The situation has been recognised by the Australian Safeguards and Non-
Proliferation Office (ASNO) for some time. Former ASNO Director-
General John Carlson states: 
The reality of course is that India is a de facto nuclear weapons 
state, and I certainly took the view in my government days that 
treating India as an outcast was actually achieving nothing.5 
4.6 Negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with India represents a 
significant change in approach for uranium supplier states like Australia. 
Following such a path is not without risk, in terms of the stability to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation architecture, and to the strategic 
environment of the region. 
4.7 On the other hand, nearly forty years of relative isolation from the 
international nuclear non-proliferation community has not prevented the 
development of a nuclear reactor electricity generation capacity in India. 
Nor has it prevented a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent. 
4.8 Further, Australia is not alone in negotiating a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with India.  Both Canada and the United States have 
agreements with India, and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, a group of 
uranium exporting states with a commitment to non-proliferation, 
conditionally agreed to the export of uranium to India in 2007. 
The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group 
4.9 The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s decision took into account the fact that 
India was strategically placed between two other nuclear weapons states, 
Pakistan and China, and was not in a position to become a signatory to the 
NPT because of the specific provisions of that Treaty.   
4.10 The Group’s decision was conditional on India adopting all of the 
obligations incumbent upon nuclear weapon states under the NPT.  In 
other words, India would have to become de facto compliant with the 
NPT.6 
4  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 5. 
5  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 5. 
6  Mr Crispin Rovere, Submission 2, p. 4. 
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4.11 Specifically, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group identified the following 
conditions for the supply of nuclear material to India: 
 India’s civil and military nuclear facilities must be separate, with the
civil nuclear facilities placed under International Atomic Entergy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards (India has concluded an Agreement between
the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities);
 India must have in place an IAEA Additional Protocol on safeguards
with respect to civil nuclear facilities;
 India must maintain its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
 India must work towards concluding a fissile material cut-off
treaty;7 and
 India will refrain from transferring uranium enrichment and plutonium
processing technologies to states that do not have them.8
4.12 The Group’s decision to conditionally allow the sale of uranium to India 
occurred at the urging of the United States, which had just concluded a 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India.9 
4.13 In relation to whether India has met the conditions set out by the Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Group, ASNO states: 
… India has fulfilled all of these six elements that were the
conditions for the Nuclear Suppliers Group.10 
4.14 Prior to the 2007 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, Australia only 
exported nuclear material to countries that were party to the NPT.  
Consequently, access to nuclear materials became an incentive to join the 
NPT, and over time the supply of nuclear materials has become a 
mechanism conferring legitimacy on a recipient state’s nuclear activities.11 
7  A treaty committing the signatory to stop producing nuclear weapons materials. 
8  Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Submission 9, p. 4. 
9  MCA, Submission 9, p. 4. 
10  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
15 June 2015, p. 4. 
11  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 3. 
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The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
4.15 Nuclear weapons states are classified according to whether they are 
signatories to the NPT.  Nuclear weapons states that are signatories to the 
NPT are: the United States; Russia; France; the United Kingdom; and 
China.12  Significantly, the NPT requires parties to: 
… pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating 
to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament …13 
4.16 The NPT is one of the most effective and respected international treaties: 
It should always be remembered – the fact that only nine countries 
possess nuclear weapons seventy years after they were first 
developed is no accident.  It is the result of careful policy making, 
successful negotiation, and the active restraint of far-sighted 
statesmen over decades.14 
4.17 The fact that the proposed Agreement involves a nuclear weapons state 
that is not signatory to the NPT has prompted a number of non-
proliferation experts and civil society groups to oppose the proposed 
Agreement.15 
4.18 The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) submission argues that, in 
a general sense, any export of nuclear materials to a nuclear weapons state 
can contribute to that state’s development of nuclear weapons by freeing 
up other nuclear material to be used in weapons.16 
4.19 In a more specific sense, Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, representing the 
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) argues that: 
The nuclear commerce with a state party that is not a part of the 
non-proliferation treaty, very significantly, particularly at this 
crucial time I believe, erodes and undermines the very purpose 
and bargain that is enshrined in that treaty and seriously would 
12  Arms Control Association, Nuclear Weapons, Who Has What at a Glance, 
<http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat>, viewed 
2 February 2015. 
13  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI. 
14  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 12. 
15  For example, Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 2; Mr Ronald Walker, Submission 6, p. 2; 
Mr Ernst Wilheim, Submission 23, p. 1; Professor Lawrence Scheinman, Submission 13, p. 1; 
the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), Submission 5, p. 2; The Uniting Church of 
Australia Justice and International Commission, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, 
Submission 8, p. 2; and Friends of the Earth (FoE), Submission 14, p. 2. 
16  ACF, Submission 5, p. 2. 
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tarnish Australia's credibility in terms of its seriousness and its 
commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 17 
4.20 Because the NPT only permits membership of nuclear armed states that 
conducted nuclear tests before 1967, India can only become a signatory to 
the NPT if it renounces the manufacture of nuclear weapons and 
dismantles its nuclear arsenal.18 
4.21 In addition under the terms of the NPT, there is no scope for another state 
to test and develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear-weapon state is defined as 
a state that conducted a nuclear test explosion prior to 1 January 1967.19 
4.22 John Carlson argues that, while it would be ideal if India disarmed and 
became a party to the NPT: 
… realistically, they are not going to do that in the current strategic
environment. 20 
4.23 The environment to which Mr Carlson is referring is the fact that India 
borders on and is in occasional conflict with China and Pakistan, both of 
which possess nuclear weapons. 
4.24 In fact, India did not conduct a full round of nuclear weapons tests, and 
declare itself a nuclear weapons state, until it was clear that Pakistan, with 
China’s assistance, was about to do the same.21 
4.25 In other words, the problem India has with the NPT is that as a result of 
the application of an arbitrary date, 1 January 1967, one emerging global 
power, China, is permitted to possess nuclear weapons, while another, 
India, is not.   
4.26 Because, in the current environment, it is not realistic for India to 
relinquish its nuclear weapons, there is no practical way India can become 
a signatory to the NPT.22 
4.27 According to John Carlson, India views the NPT as inherently 
discriminatory: 
… because it divides the world into the haves and the have-nots—
the nuclear-weapon states and the others…23 
17  Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(Australia) (ICAN), Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 14. 
18  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 5. 
19  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 8. 
20  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 8. 
21  Mr Rovere, Crispin, Submission 2, p. 3. 
22  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 5. 
23  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 8. 
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4.28 Crispin Rovere summarises India’s dilemma as follows: 
The key point is that India is very sensitive to any perceived bias 
by the international community that India is less than an emerging 
Great Power on par with the United States and China.24 
4.29 The Indian people consider India to be a burgeoning great power with all 
that means for the international system and India’s status as a nuclear 
weapons state in the long term.25 
4.30 ASNO has recognised that India is a de-facto nuclear weapons state for 
some time.  Former ASNO Director-General, John Carlson states: 
My view has always been that we have to do something else with 
India now, that there is no point in flogging a dead horse. 26 
4.31 This view is not held by the bulk of the signatories to the NPT.  Ronald 
Walker comments that keeping faith with the NPT: 
… amounts to a standard of behaviour and mutual expectations 
which the countries of the world impose upon each other to 
reduce the risk of global nuclear war and also the risk of the 
problems which so often arise over the possession of nuclear 
weapons. 
Without such standards, mutual expectations and controls, 
peaceful international trade in nuclear material and technology 
would be impossible.27 
4.32 The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International Commission, 
Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, and Friends of the Earth (FoE) point out 
that at the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, 
118 non-aligned nations complained that the United States, in reaching a 
nuclear cooperation treaty with India, had given a country not party to the 
NPT more benefits than NPT signatories.28 
4.33 Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, representing ICAN, summarises the 
potential risks associated with reaching nuclear cooperation agreements 
with India: 
It has been said before, but it has been said with increasing 
urgency and reality, that that treaty, which is really the linchpin of 
the global regime that embodies this crucial obligation on the part 
24  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 3. 
25  Mr Rovere, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 7. 
26  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 5. 
27  Mr Walker, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 9. 
28  The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International Commission, Synod of Victoria and 
Tasmania, Submission 8, p. 4; and FoE, Submission 14, p. 5. 
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of the nuclear arms states to disarm in exchange for those who do 
not have the weapons not acquiring them, is really at risk of 
unravelling. 29 
Comprehensive test ban treaty 
4.34 India is not a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
However, India has undertaken a unilateral moratorium on weapons 
testing.30 
4.35 According to Crispin Rovere, India has a strong incentive to abrogate its 
moratorium.  India has not successfully detonated a thermonuclear 
(hydrogen) device31, and is therefore concerned about the effectiveness of 
its deterrent.32 
4.36 At present, China has nuclear superiority over India, both in terms of the 
number of warheads and in terms of having successfully exploded a 
thermonuclear device.  Mr Rovere argues that India may feel it necessary 
to test a thermonuclear device in order to achieve parity with China.33 
Missed opportunities 
4.37 A number of participants to the inquiry view the proposed Agreement as 
a missed opportunity to obtain greater non-proliferation concessions from 
India.34 
4.38 Crispin Rovere argues: 
… it is critical that we ask India to undertake all the obligations 
they would have if they were a party to the NPT as a nuclear 
armed state, and in this treaty we have not done that. 35 
4.39 John Carlson compares the proposed Agreement with that negotiated with 
France in 1982.  At the time, France was not a signatory to the NPT, but the 
29  Associate Professor Ruff, (ICAN) Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 13. 
30  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 6. 
31  Thermonuclear, or hydrogen, devices are an order of magnitude more powerful than nuclear 
(uranium or plutonium) devices. 
32  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 6. 
33  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 6. 
34  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 3. 
35  Mr Rovere, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 8. 
30 REPORT 151: TREATY TABLED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
Agreement required France to meet the obligations of the NPT, resulting 
in France eventually signing the NPT in 1992.36 
4.40 The key NPT provisions Mr Carlson believes should be applied in the 
proposed agreement are: 
 a commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament;
 a full separation of civilian and military nuclear facilities;
 signing the CTBT;
 real support for a fissile material cut-off treaty; and
 placing all imported nuclear material under IAEA safeguards.37
4.41 Crispin Rovere points out that India’s need for imported nuclear fuel 
provides scope for the negotiation of nuclear cooperation agreements that 
significantly improve nuclear non-proliferation outcomes. 
4.42 For example, the proposed Agreement could have required India to ratify 
the CTBT if the United States Senate does so.  This obligation would match 
an obligation made by China, and would consequently not prejudice 
India.38 
4.43 Although an ongoing halt to nuclear weapons testing was one of the 
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s conditions for the sale of nuclear materials to 
India, the proposed Agreement does not specifically provide that supplies 
of nuclear materials will cease in the event of India resuming weapons 
testing.39 
4.44 However, during the public hearings, ASNO gave a strong indication that 
the Australian Government would consider a resumption of nuclear 
testing to be a breach of the proposed Agreement: 
… if India were to conduct a nuclear test, Australia could invoke
article 14 to cease cooperation and potentially to terminate the 
agreement immediately. 40 
36  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 2. 
37  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, pp. 3–4. 
38  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 8. 
39  Mr Rovere, Submission 2, p. 6. 
40  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 2. 
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The way forward 
4.45 The evidence before the Committee indicates that nuclear cooperation 
with India is probably the biggest issue in nuclear non-proliferation for 
some decades. 
4.46 The evidence suggests that nuclear cooperation with India is opposed by 
the bulk of signatories to the NPT and may destabilise the international 
non-proliferation architecture. 
4.47 On the other hand, India cannot join the NPT: 
… given that it has a more powerful strategic nuclear rival on its 
border, China, and a much weaker, unstable nuclear rival on 
another border, Pakistan, it is not realistic to ask them to do that.41 
4.48 Forty years of isolation under the NPT has not produced nuclear 
disarmament on the Indian subcontinent.  In essence, the proposed 
Agreement is an effort to try a different approach.  Australia is not alone 
in adopting this new approach.  In reaching its decision to allow the 
export of nuclear materials to India, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group: 
… wanted to see India brought more into the nuclear non-
proliferation mainstream.42 
4.49 According to John Carlson, states that have negotiated nuclear 
cooperation agreements with India: 
… are prepared to supply India for civil purposes for two reasons:
one is to see modern, safe technology available in India—I think 
there is an important nuclear safety aspect to this. Another reason 
is to encourage India to take up international norms in this area—
things like no testing and so on.43 
4.50 India’s need for nuclear materials could produce compounding pressure 
on the Indian Government to meet international non-proliferation norms: 
… the more India becomes dependent for power generation on
imported technology and imported fuel, the more this acts as a 
moderating factor on its behaviour. It would make India hesitate 
to, for instance, conduct further nuclear tests if the consequence 
would be an immediate cut-off of fuel for all the imported 
reactors. 44 
41  Mr Rovere, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 8. 
42  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, 15 June 2015, p. 6. 
43  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 5. 
44  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 5. 
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4.51 Further: 
Bringing India into this tradition will continue to underpin the 
assurance of peaceful use and allow the two nations to work 
together on enhancing the non-proliferation and safeguards 
system. 45 
4.52 The Committee believes that, as an approach to non-proliferation, 
engaging with India to bring it into the nuclear non-proliferation 
mainstream will only work if India makes genuine non-proliferation 
advances.  Only genuine non-proliferation advances will ameliorate the 
potential risk to the non-proliferation framework perceived by the bulk of 
signatories to the NPT. 
4.53 Consequently, should the proposed Agreement be ratified, the Committee 
urges the Australian Government to commit significant diplomatic 
resources to encouraging India to become a party to the CTBT, and to 
negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty. 
Recommendation 1 
4.54 The Committee urges the Australian Government to commit significant 
diplomatic resources to encouraging India to become a party to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and to negotiate a fissile material cut-
off treaty. 
4.55 Further, the Committee recommends the Government consider facilitating 
the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty for the Indian 
subcontinent region.  Such a treaty could feasibly have an initial goal of 
preventing the development of thermonuclear weapons by India and 
Pakistan, and prevent the deployment of such weapons to the region by 
China. 
45  Dr Vanessa Guthrie, Board Member, Minerals Council of Australia, Committee Hansard, 
Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 14. 
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Recommendation 2 
4.56 The Committee recommends the Australian Government considers 
facilitating the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty for the 
Indian subcontinent region.  Such a treaty could feasibly have an initial 
goal of preventing the development of thermonuclear weapons by India 
and Pakistan, and prevent the deployment of such weapons to the 
region by China. 
34 REPORT 151: TREATY TABLED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
5 
Nuclear safety in India 
5.1 India possesses a large and well established nuclear infrastructure. 
5.2 India’s civilian nuclear program was established in 1954, with the creation 
of the Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy and the 
Atomic Energy Commission. Civilian electricity generating nuclear 
reactors are run by a Government owned enterprise, the Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India.1 
5.3 The first electricity generating reactor was brought on line at Tarapur in 
Mahrashtra in 1969, and at present India has in the vicinity of thirty 
electricity generating reactors in operation.2 
5.4 At the time of writing, five reactors in three locations are in development. 
The reactors under construction are either the 700 megawatt Pressurised 
Heavy Water Reactor type first built in India in 1973, or the VVER3 
1,000 megawatt type, a high pressure water reactor first built in India in 
2014.4 
5.5 The first VVER 1,000 megawatt type reactor was constructed in 1975 in the 
Soviet Union, and is reported to have a number of deficiencies, including: 
 substandard wiring of the emergency electrical system and reactor
protection system;
 fire protection systems that do not meet current standards;
1  Government of India Department of Nuclear Energy, About us, 
(http://www.dae.nic.in/?q=node/634), viewed 20 January 2015. 
2  Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Plants under operation, 
<http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/AllProjectOperationDisplay.aspx>, viewed 20 January 2015. 
3  VVER means Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reaktor, or ‘water–water power reactor’.  It is a 
more modern type of pressured water reactor. 
4  Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Plants under construction, 
<http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=91>, viewed 
21 January 2015. 
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 deficient quality control in design and construction; and
 a less forgiving and stable reactor system than Western counterparts.5
5.6 The VVER reactors are the most modern in use in India and are equivalent 
to generation III reactors.  It is not clear whether the reactors under 
construction in India incorporate improvements that deal with the 
identified deficiencies of these reactors.6 
5.7 The best available reactors at the moment are generation IV reactors such 
as those being constructed by the United Arab Emirates, recently 
considered by the Committee.7 
5.8 Generation IV reactors are expected to be built as a result of India’s 
nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.8 
5.9 Evidence to the inquiry identifies three significant issues relating to the 
safety of nuclear facilities in India: 
 the lack of separation between military and civilian nuclear facilities;
 the quality of regulation and oversight of nuclear facilities in India; and
 civil society concerns, such as the treatment of those opposed to the
building of nuclear facilities.
5.10 These issues will be discussed in this Chapter. 
Separation of Civil and Military nuclear facilities 
5.11 As discussed in the previous Chapter, as a prerequisite for the transfer of 
nuclear materials to India, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group required India to 
separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place the civil facilities 
under International Atomic Entergy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.9 
5  United States National Nuclear Safety Administration, International Nuclear Safety Project, 
The VVER-1 000, <http://insp.pnnl.gov/-profiles-reactors-vver1000.htm>, viewed 
21 January 2015. 
6  United States National Nuclear Safety Administration, International Nuclear Safety Project, 
The VVER-1 000, <http://insp.pnnl.gov/-profiles-reactors-vver1000.htm>, viewed 
21 January 2015. 
7  Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Report 137, tabled 18 March 2014. 
8  Nuclear Power Corporation of India, Plants under construction, 
<http://www.npcil.nic.in/main/ConstructionDetail.aspx?ReactorID=91>, viewed 
21 January 2015. 
9  Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), Submission 9, p. 4. 
NUCLEAR SAFETY IN INDIA 37 
5.12 In 2009, India concluded with the IAEA the Agreement between the 
Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (the IAEA 
Agreement).10 
5.13 The IAEA Agreement is, according to John Carlson, significantly more 
complex than Australia has dealt with in the past.11 
5.14 For example, the IAEA Agreement applies only to nuclear materials 
imported under agreements that specifically apply the provisions of the 
IAEA Agreement.12 
5.15 According to John Carlson, Australia has in the past interpreted the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Australia is bound, as 
precluding any nuclear exports to countries that do not have a safeguards 
agreement with the IAEA applying to all nuclear material. 13 
5.16 The Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) explains 
that: 
The design of IAEA safeguards for India is specific to its situation. 
On the one hand, the presence of both civil and military nuclear 
facilities affects the scope of IAEA safeguards in India. But a 
consequence is that the frequency and intensity of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's inspections of India's civil 
nuclear facilities is in fact greater than for most non-proliferation 
treaty parties. This offers helpful additional assurance that 
Australian-obligated nuclear material would not be diverted from 
peaceful use. 14 
5.17 The IAEA Agreement contains an Annex that lists the facilities that India 
wishes to place under IAEA safeguards. In effect, this means that there are 
three categories of nuclear facilities in India for safeguards purposes: 
military facilities; civilian facilities not covered by the IAEA agreement (or 
‘unsafeguarded’); and civilian facilities covered by the IAEA agreement 
(‘safeguarded’).15 
10  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [2014] ATNIF26, preamble. 
11  Mr John Carlson, Submission 1, p. 2. 
12  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 4. 
13  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 4. 
14  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
12 February 2015, p. 2. 
15  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 6. 
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5.18 India’s definition of unsafeguarded facilities includes civilian facilities 
considered to be of strategic national importance, and civilian facilities 
that are in the same complex as designated military facilities.16 
5.19 Such facilities include civilian electricity generating fast breeder reactors 
used to produce military grade plutonium.  Mr Carlson argues that the 
existence of unsafeguarded facilities effectively means that the separation 
of military and civilian nuclear facilities is a matter of administrative 
definition, rather than a reality.17 
5.20 Under the IAEA Agreement, India is able to temporarily designate an 
‘unsafeguarded’ facility as ‘safeguarded.’18 
5.21 According to Mr Carlson: 
The [IAEA] agreement has provisions on substitution of 
unsafeguarded for safeguarded material, exemption of material 
from safeguards in certain circumstances…suspension of 
safeguards, and termination of safeguards.19 
5.22 At the time the inquiry commenced, the Annex to the IAEA Agreement 
listed only 14 of India’s civilian nuclear facilities as ‘safeguarded’.  The list 
in the Annex contradicted statement in the National Interest Analysis 
(NIA) of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 
proposed Agreement) that all civilian facilities were safeguarded.20 
5.23 By June 2015, ASNO was able to reassure the Committee that: 
The commitment that India made on the separation of its civilian 
and military programs was to have 22 facilities that would be 
brought under IAEA safeguards. They have brought all 22 of those 
facilities under IAEA safeguards, so they have complied with and 
completed that process at this point in time.21 
16  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 7. 
17  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 7. 
18  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 6. 
19  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 8. 
20  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 7. 
21  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p. 7. 
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Nuclear regulation 
5.24 The Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) submission points out 
that, in 2012, the Indian Auditor General released Report No. - 9  of 2012-13 
for the period ended March 2012 - Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic 
Energy Regulatory Board (Department of Atomic Energy), which detailed a 
number of concerns about the regulation of nuclear energy in India.22 
5.25 In particular, the Report identified deficiencies in: the independence of the 
nuclear safety regulator; the quality and number of nuclear safety plans; 
the adoption of international benchmarks for the inspection of nuclear 
facilities; and the preparation of decommissioning plans for nuclear power 
plants.23 
5.26 In the Report, the Auditor General stated: 
Failure to have an autonomous and empowered regulator is 
fraught with grave risks as the recent report of the Fukushima 
Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission has 
confirmed. 24 
5.27 The Report made a number of recommendations to rectify these 
deficiencies, including: 
 establishing an independent nuclear regulator under law;
 developing required safety procedures expeditiously;
 making use of the IAEA to establish best practice for nuclear power
plant inspections; and
 making plans, both administrative and financial, for the
decommissioning of nuclear power plants when those plants are
constructed.25
22  Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), Submission 5, p. 2. 
23  Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. - 9 of 2012-13 for the period ended March 
2012 - Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (Department of Atomic 
Energy), pp VI-IX. 
<http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wi
se/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2012_2013/SD/Report_9/Exe_Summ.p
df>, viewed 5 May 2015. 
24  Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. - 9 of 2012-13 for the period ended March 
2012 - Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (Department of Atomic 
Energy), p 73. 
<http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/our_products/audit_report/Government_Wise/unio
n_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2012_2013/SD/Report_9/Chap_10.pdf>, 
viewed 24 August 2015. 
25  Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Report No. - 9 of 2012-13 for the period ended March 
2012 - Performance Audit on Activities of Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (Department of Atomic 
Energy), pp IX-X. 
<http://www.saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_Report/Government_Wi
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5.28 In relation to the independence of the nuclear regulator in India 
Dr Mark Zirnsak of the Uniting Church of Australia Justice and 
International Commission, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania states: 
The concerns that we have raised which have come from analysis 
out of India, by an Indian academic particularly, have been the 
lack of independence of the regulatory body, the Atomic Energy 
Regulatory Board, and that it has been a longstanding 
recommendation that that body be made independent. Currently, 
it is still under the authority of the Indian government with the 
Indian government being able to interfere with, potentially, its 
operation as such. 26 
5.29 The ACF submission argues that these deficiencies have not been 
effectively resolved, and that the proposed Agreement should not be 
ratified until they are resolved.27 
5.30 The Indian Government’s response to the Report indicated that the 
recommendation would be implemented, and legislation was introduced 
into the Indian Parliament to establish an independent nuclear regulator.28  
5.31 The Nuclear Threat Initiative found that India's nuclear materials security 
conditions could be improved by establishing an independent regulatory 
agency.29 
5.32 The Committee also notes that in March 2015, the IAEA published some of 
the findings of a mission to India to investigate India’s regulatory 
framework.  The mission’s findings appear to support the ACF’s 
assertions regarding India’s failure to rectify deficiencies identified in 
2012.30 
se/union_audit/recent_reports/union_performance/2012_2013/SD/Report_9/Exe_Summ.p
df>, viewed 5 May 2015. 
26  Dr Mark Zirnsak, The Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International Commission, 
Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 5. 
27  ACF, Submission 5, p. 2. 
28  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 6. 
29  Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(Australia) (ICAN), Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 14. 
30  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), March 2015, IAEA Mission Concludes Peer Review 
of India's Nuclear Regulatory Framework, 
<https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-mission-concludes-peer-review-
indias-nuclear-regulatory-framework>, viewed 5 May 2015. 
NUCLEAR SAFETY IN INDIA 41 
5.33 For example, the IAEA mission found that: 
 the Indian nuclear regulatory agency was still not independent under
law;
 the existing policies and arrangements at the nuclear regulator needed
to be reviewed to ensure its independence;
 the frequency and quality of inspections at nuclear facilities was still not
up to best practice standards; and
 there was still insufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear
facilities.31
5.34 India’s apparent failure to rectify specific problems that have been 
identified by a number of credible entities over a number of years is a 
concern to the Committee. 
5.35 The Committee notes that, in Japan, despite an apparently robust 
regulatory environment, breaches of regulations contributed to the 
Fukushima facility accident.  Australian nuclear material was in use at the 
Fukushima facility at the time of the accident. 
5.36 The Committee believes that the Australian Government cannot overlook 
such clear warnings about the quality of India’s nuclear regulatory 
framework. 
5.37 Consequently, the Committee recommends that, should the proposed 
Agreement be ratified, uranium sales to India only commence when the 
following conditions are met: 
 India has achieved the full separation of civil and military nuclear
facilities as verified by the IAEA;
 India has established an independent nuclear regulatory authority
under law;
 the Indian nuclear regulator’s existing policies and arrangements have
been reviewed to ensure its independence;
 the frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of onsite inspections at
nuclear facilities have been verified by the IAEA as being best practice
standard; and
 the lack of sufficient planning for the decommissioning of nuclear
facilities has been rectified.
31  IAEA, March 2015, IAEA Mission Concludes Peer Review of India's Nuclear Regulatory Framework, 
<https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-mission-concludes-peer-review-
indias-nuclear-regulatory-framework>, viewed 5 May 2015. 
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Recommendation 3 
5.38 Committee recommends that, should the Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy be ratified, uranium sales to India 
only commence when the following conditions are met: 
 India has achieved the full separation of civil and military
nuclear facilities as verified by the IAEA;
 India has established an independent nuclear regulatory
authority under law;
 the Indian nuclear regulator’s existing policies and
arrangements have been reviewed to ensure its independence;
 the frequency, quality and comprehensiveness of onsite
inspections at nuclear facilities have been verified by the IAEA
as being best practice standard; and
 the lack of sufficient planning for the decommissioning of
nuclear facilities has been rectified.
6 
Specific provisions 
6.1 In Chapter Three, the Committee noted the Australian Safeguards and 
Non-Proliferation Office’s (ASNO’s) assertion that, while particular 
provisions of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (the 
proposed Agreement) differ from those contained in other Australian 
nuclear cooperation agreements, the actual outcome will be the same. 
6.2 This assertion is extensively contested by participants in the inquiry. 
6.3 Debate about the proposed Agreement itself revolves around a number of 
specific issues: 
 accounting for Australian nuclear materials;
 the mixing of safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials in Indian
nuclear facilities;
 reprocessing Australian nuclear materials;
 enrichment of Australian nuclear materials;
 the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of India
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
to Civilian Nuclear Facilities;
 conflict resolution and
 the legality of the proposed Agreement.
6.4 These matters will now be considered individually. 
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Accounting for Australian nuclear material 
6.5 Article III of the proposed Agreement requires each party to maintain a 
system of accounting for and control of items subject to the Agreement.1  
6.6 John Carlson provides the following background to this provision: 
This terminology relates to the mechanisms for identifying which 
specific batches of nuclear material are subject to the agreement. 
Accounting and tracking are essential on legal grounds—
otherwise, the agreement will have no practical effect. They are 
also needed to meet the requirements of our Safeguards Act. The 
agreement expressly requires each party to maintain an 
accounting system for materials subject to the agreement.  
6.7 The requirement on countries that receive Australian uranium to track and 
account for that uranium and its by-products is a cornerstone of 
Australian nuclear cooperation agreements. It permits Australia to be 
satisfied that the non-proliferation and safety aspects of Australia’s 
nuclear cooperation agreements are being adhered to. 
6.8 Australian tracking and accounting provisions exceed those required by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its safeguards 
agreements.  The IAEA safeguards agreements only require that all 
uranium and its by-products be accounted for.  Tracking on the basis of 
the source country of the uranium is not required by the IAEA.2 
6.9 Nevertheless, a number of jurisdictions, including the United States and 
Europe, do as a matter of course track and account for nuclear material by 
source country for all imported nuclear materials.3 
6.10 The specifics of the accounting system for each nuclear cooperation 
agreement are developed as part of the Administrative Arrangement 
related to the agreement.  The Administrative Arrangement is an 
unpublished document.4 
1  Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [2014] ATNIF26 (hereafter referred to as the proposed 
Agreement), Article III. 
2  Mr John Carlson, Submission 1.2, p. 3. 
3  See for example Article 9 of the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of The United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy; and 
Article 79 of the EURATOM Treaty and EURATOM Commission Regulation 302/2005. 
4  See for example the proposed Agreement, Article II. 
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6.11 The wording of Article III has been understood by a number of witnesses, 
including John Carlson5 and Ronald Walker6 as permitting India to 
establish its own system of accounting and control that may not meet 
Australian standards but will meet International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) standards.   
6.12 The Indian Government appears to have had some difficulties agreeing to 
an accounting system that could track nuclear material by source country.  
John Carlson, writing in early November 2014, cited stalled negotiations 
between the United States and India over an administrative agreement 
made under their nuclear cooperation agreement because of an apparent 
refusal by India to account for United States nuclear materials.7 
6.13 Further, during negotiations for the proposed Agreement in 2013, the ABC 
reported that Indian negotiators were concerned about this aspect of 
Australia’s policy because Indian nuclear regulators did not have the 
capacity to undertake such accounting.8 
6.14 According to Mr Carlson: 
… if [Australian nuclear material] is not identified and accounted
for as such, the conditions of the agreement will be readily 
evaded... 9 
6.15 The Committee considered for some time how it could satisfy itself that 
such a critical matter as the specifics of the tracking and accounting 
arrangements would be in Australia’s national interest. 
6.16 The method arrived at was to assess, by way of a private briefing from the 
Director-General of ASNO, Dr Robert Floyd, and through questioning at 
the final hearing, whether negotiations over the Administrative 
Arrangement had reached a point where Dr Floyd was satisfied that he 
could comply with his obligations under section 51 of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Safeguards) Act of 1987 (the Act).10 
5  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 16. 
6  Mr Ronald Walker, Submission 6.4, p. 2. 
7  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 11.  The United States has subsequently announced that it has 
completed negotiations on an Administrative Arrangement with India. 
8  Ms Stephanie March, ‘Nuclear deal: Australia's uranium deal with India may include weaker 
monitoring safeguards,’ ABC, 19 November 2013, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-
19/australia27s-nuclear-deal-with-india/5101030>, viewed 3 February 2015. 
9  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 12. 
10  The private briefing and the final hearing took place on the same day, Monday 15 June 2015. 
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6.17 Dr Floyd summarised his obligations under the Act in the following terms: 
…the Act goes to the specificity of the reporting that I have to
provide the parliament on an annual basis. The specificity is quite 
detailed: I have to go to the total quantities of Australian obligated 
nuclear material in each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle; I have to go 
to the intended end use of that material and, furthermore, I have to 
report any unreconciled differences in those quantities of nuclear 
material wherever they might arise. 11 
6.18 On 12 February 2015, the Director-General of ASNO advised the 
Committee that: 
The administrative arrangement is obviously under negotiation, 
but what we need to deliver is clear in the Safeguards Act. One of 
those aspects is my reporting requirements, which are clearly 
outlined in the Safeguards Act. So we are negotiating to be able to 
deliver an administrative arrangement that sits with the nuclear 
cooperation agreement that would meet those requirements. 12 
6.19 By 15 June 2015, he was able to advise: 
I am very confident that the mechanism we have developed will 
allow me to determine the disposition of Australian obligated 
nuclear material in India and fulfil my reporting obligations under 
the Safeguards Act. Because the content of such instruments is 
confidential to the parties, I will not be able to make the Australia-
India administrative arrangement public. However, my obligation 
to report each year to the parliament on the disposition of 
Australian obligated nuclear material means that a key product of 
the administrative arrangement will, in fact, be public.13 
6.20 Based on these statements, the Committee trusts that the tracking and 
accounting mechanism in the Administrative Arrangement will ensure 
that Australian nuclear material can be tracked and accounted for. 
11  Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
(ASNO), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 
15 June 2015, p. 3. 
12  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 2. 
13  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p. 3. 
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Mixing of safeguarded and unsafeguarded materials 
6.21 According to Professor Lawrence Scheinman, under the Agreement between 
the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (the IAEA Agreement), 
safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material can be used together 
and unsafeguarded nuclear material can be substituted one for the other 
causing safeguarded material to end up in a military program.14   
6.22 John Carlson also makes this point: 
The IAEA agreement gives India a number of options for moving 
nuclear material between its safeguarded and its unsafeguarded 
programs. 15 
6.23 John Carlson argues that Australia's standard safeguards agreements, 
such as those with Russia and China, close off any such options. The 
proposed Agreement with India does not. As a consequence, according to 
Mr Carlson, Australian material could be used to produce unsafeguarded 
plutonium that ends up in India's nuclear weapon program.16 
6.24 This is also the interpretation of Kalman Robertson, of the Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, School of Politics and International Relations at 
the Australian National University.   
6.25 He argues that the proposed Agreement appears to hypothetically permit 
India to fission a mix of 75 per cent unsafeguarded nuclear material and 
25 per cent Australian nuclear material in a reactor for a short period of 
time in order to produce irradiated fuel of weapons grade.  The 75 per cent 
of the fuel that is unsafeguarded can then be taken to an unsafeguarded 
facility for reprocessing into weapons material.17 
6.26 ASNO concedes that such a hypothetical situation could occur, but 
provides an extensive explanation as to how, in practice, the proposed 
Agreement will prevent this from happening.   
6.27 Firstly, Dr Robert Floyd makes it clear that India’s obligations prohibit 
Australian nuclear material from being used for military purposes at all 
times: 
… India's fundamental undertaking, which is set out in paragraph
1, Article I of their agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, what is called INFCIRC/754, states: 
14  Professor Lawrence Scheinman, Submission 13, p. 1. 
15  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 2. 
16  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 2. 
17  Mr Kalman Robertson, Submission 11, p. 12. 
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India undertakes that none of the items subject to this 
Agreement … shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear 
weapon or to further any other military purpose … 
… this undertaking goes beyond a commitment not to divert
safeguarded material. It also prohibits any use by India of 
safeguarded material, or a safeguarded facility, in a way which 
would assist its nuclear weapons program.  
… The peaceful use undertaking in paragraph 1 of Article VII of
the proposed Australia-India NCA achieves a very similar result, 
and the culmination of that paragraph, combined with the 
definition of 'peaceful purpose' in Article I, excludes the use of 
Australian obligated material for any military purpose. 18 
6.28 In relation to the specific example given by Lawrence Scheinman, John 
Carlson and Kalman Robertson, Dr Floyd states: 
… as soon as it [Australian nuclear material] is mixed, the whole
lot becomes safeguarded and so in one sense you can never have 
our material mixed with unsafeguarded material because as soon 
as such a scenario occurs, the whole thing is safeguarded. 19 
6.29 The Committee is satisfied that the mixing of Australian nuclear material 
with unsafeguarded material would be contrary to India’s obligations 
both to Australia and the IAEA. 
Reprocessing 
6.30 Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel is a process by which nuclear fuel that 
has already been used is refined to extract any remaining usable nuclear 
fuel.  This is a highly regulated process because the products extracted 
from the spent fuel include materials essential to weapons manufacture, 
such as plutonium. 
6.31 To highlight how sensitive reprocessing is, Crispin Rovere cites the 
example of the cooperation agreement between the United States and 
South Korea.  Despite being close allies, and South Korea having a large 
and well organised nuclear power program, South Korea was not 
permitted to reprocess United States nuclear materials.20 
18  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, 15 June 2015, p. 7. 
19  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, 15 June 2015, p. 8. 
20  Mr Crispin Rovere, Submission 2, p. 9. 
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6.32 Reprocessing of Australian nuclear material has only been permitted in 
Australian nuclear cooperation agreements with Japan and the EU. In 
these cases, the reprocessing, use and storage of reprocessed material can 
only take place in Australian approved facilities.  This is called 
programmatic consent.21 
6.33 Programmatic consent is not possible with India because it does not yet 
have reprocessing facilities that Australia can approve.  However: 
India has indicated that consent for reprocessing of Australian 
obligated nuclear material is very important to it. Although actual 
reprocessing of Australian obligated nuclear material would be 
more than a decade away, this process plays a significant role in 
India's plan for further development of its civil nuclear power, 
including recycling of nuclear fuel. India wants assurance that 
Australian obligated nuclear material will be able to be used in 
accordance with those plans. 22 
6.34 Consequently, Article VI of the proposed Agreement grants consent to the 
Indian Government to reprocess nuclear materials in facilities dedicated to 
reprocessing in accordance with the Arrangements and Procedures Agreed 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
India pursuant to Article 6(iii) of their Agreement for Cooperation Concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done at Washington D.C. on 30 July 2010. 
6.35 This reprocessing agreement permits India to reprocess nuclear materials 
of United States origin at two reprocessing facilities yet to be 
constructed.23 
6.36 The change in approach from Australia’s usual programmatic consent to 
consent based on an agreement between the United States and India is at 
the heart of concerns about reprocessing in the proposed Agreement. 
These concerns are expressed by, for example, John Carlson.24  
6.37 From the Committee’s point of view, the critical issue is whether the 
safeguards applying to the reprocessing plants and any resulting 
reprocessed Australian nuclear material under the proposed Agreement 
are as strong as they would be if programmatic consent was used. 
6.38 John Carlson points out that the agreement between the United States and 
India applies safeguards only to the proposed reprocessing plants 
21  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 20. 
22  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p 2. 
23  United States State Department, Arrangements and Procedures Agreed between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of India pursuant to Article 6(iii) of their Agreement 
for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, done at Washington D.C. on 30 July 
2010, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/139194.htm>, viewed on 5 June 2015. 
24  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 20. 
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themselves, and not to other facilities at which the reprocessed material 
may be used.  It also applies accounting standards to United States nuclear 
materials only, so it is not clear that it will apply to Australian materials 
reprocessed at these plants.25 
6.39 According to ASNO: 
… For India, the proposed Agreement invokes detailed best-
practice conditions from the US-India agreement, designed to 
ensure that IAEA safeguards can be implemented in an effective 
and efficient matter. The advantage is that this represents greater 
prescription in terms of safeguards than Australia has sought for 
reprocessing when compared to other cases.26 
6.40 Reprocessed Australian nuclear materials used in Indian nuclear facilities 
will, according to ASNO, continue to be covered by the peaceful use only 
undertaking in the proposed Agreement.27 
6.41 This is not the same as the programmatic approach, which would list 
specific facilities at which the material could be used, but it does apply a 
de facto limitation on the sites at which reprocessed material can be used 
because reprocessed material will only be able to be used in IAEA 
safeguarded facilities. 
6.42 On this basis, the Committee is satisfied that, while the proposed 
Agreement takes a new approach to reprocessing, it seeks to achieve the 
same safeguards standards as the previous programmatic approach. 
Enrichment 
6.43 Article VI of the proposed Agreement permits the enrichment of 
Australian nuclear material to a level of less than 20 per cent in the isotope 
235 of uranium.  Enrichment above this level can be undertaken with 
Australia’s prior consent.28  The purpose of this Article is to prevent the 
enrichment of Australian nuclear material to a concentration that could be 
used in nuclear weapons. 
6.44 This Article has proven contentious because of the interpretation of the 
wording in the second sentence of Article VI (5), which states: 
Enrichment of twenty percent and above in the isotope of uranium 
235 shall be undertaken with prior consent of the Supplier Party. 
25  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 21. 
26  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p. 2. 
27  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p. 2. 
28  The proposed Agreement, Article VI. 
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6.45 Ronald Walker, former Australian Representative to the IAEA, argues 
that: 
According to those words, Australia does not claim and India does 
not acknowledge a right to withhold consent, to be satisfied as to 
the purpose of the enrichment and as to the applicable controls, 
and to withdraw the consent if we are dissatisfied. The text is open 
to the interpretation that Australia has given its consent in 
advance to high-level enrichment, unconditionally. Worse, on a 
strict reading, as a lawyer would, Australia's consent, given or not, 
has no legal or operational significance.29 
6.46 This view is supported by Ernst Willheim, Visiting Fellow at the ANU 
College of Law, and previous head of the Australian Government Office of 
General Counsel. According to Mr Willheim, a comparison with another 
article in the proposed Agreement, Article IX, shows that Australian prior 
consent to enrichment to 20 per cent or more may not be required.30 
6.47 Article IX of the Treaty deals with retransfers of nuclear materials. 
It provides, in part, that items subject to the Agreement shall not be 
transferred without the prior written consent of Australia (emphasis 
added). According to Dr Willheim, the language is clear and 
unambiguous.31 
6.48 Dr Willheim argues that: 
… If the intention of Article VI were similar, that is, to require
prior Australian consent to reprocessing, one would naturally 
have expected similar language. So there are two very different 
consent provisions in the same treaty document. The inclusion of 
such a clear and unambiguous requirement for prior consent in 
Article IX and the very different language in Article VI requires 
the obvious inference that the intention was different.32 
6.49 According to ASNO, the second sentence of Article VI (5) should not be 
read without reference to the first sentence, which is clear that consent has 
only been given to enrich Australian nuclear material to less than 20 per 
cent in the isotope 235 of uranium.33 
6.50 Read together, ASNO claims that the meaning of the article is 
unambiguous.34 
29  Mr Walker, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 9. 
30  Mr Ernst Willheim, Submission 23, p. 2. 
31  Mr Willheim, Submission 23, p. 2. 
32  Mr Willheim, Submission 23, p. 2. 
33  Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO), Submission 22, p. 3. 
34  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 3. 
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6.51 ASNO points out that this form of words is also used in the United States 
nuclear cooperation agreement with India, and the United States 
Government is equally satisfied as to the meaning of the article.35 
6.52 Further, ASNO indicates that in discussions with Indian officials, it is clear 
that they understand that consent is required for enrichment of 20 per cent 
or more. 36 
6.53 The Committee is not in a position to make an informed decision as to 
which of the advice provided by Mr Willheim or the advice provided by 
ASNO is the more accurate.  Accordingly, the Committee recommends 
that the Australian Government outline the legal advice it has received on 
this matter. 
Recommendation 4 
6.54 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government outline 
the legal advice it has received regarding the consent to reprocessing 
provisions in Article VI of the proposed Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in 
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 
The additional protocol 
6.55 The NIA indicates that Australian nuclear material will be subject to the 
safeguards under the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the 
Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities (the Additional 
Protocol).37 
6.56 This statement has caused a degree of confusion, because the Additional 
Protocol applies only to nuclear exports from India, and does not apply to 
nuclear facilities in India.  In other words, it may have no application to 
Australian nuclear material.38 
35  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 3. 
36  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 3. 
37  National Interest Analysis, [2014] ATNIA 22, Agreement between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, [2014] ATNIF 26, 
hereafter referred to as the NIA, para 11. 
38  Mr Carlson, Submission 1.2, p. 4; and Mr Robertson, Submission 11, p. 7. 
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6.57 At the public hearing on 15 June 2015, Dr Robert Floyd clarified precisely 
how the Additional Protocol applies to Australian nuclear material: 
The additional protocol has two key important areas that do apply 
to facilities that Australian material would be found in. One is the 
right for inspectors to obtain long-term, multi-entry visas, which 
adds to the IAEA's ability to carry out short-notice inspections; the 
second is new rights on the use of communications systems, 
including facilitating of remote monitoring of those nuclear 
facilities. That allows for technical measures to be put in place to 
strengthen safeguards at facilities where Australian obligated 
nuclear material could be found. 39 
6.58 In other words, the application of the Additional Protocol will have a 
peripheral advantage to Australia in that it will permit the IAEA to better 
perform its monitoring functions at safeguarded Indian nuclear facilities. 
Enforcement and Conflict resolution 
6.59 A number of participants have identified the lack of a conflict resolution 
provision in the proposed Agreement as a significant flaw.  All other 
Australian nuclear cooperation agreements, with the exception of the 
agreement with the United States, contain conflict resolution provisions.40 
6.60 ASNO points out that, while the proposed Agreement contains no specific 
conflict resolution provision, there are a number of mechanisms for 
dealing with a dispute.  For example, mechanisms for dealing with 
disputes can be found in Articles XI and XII of the Agreement.41 
6.61 Australia may also, ASNO argues, make use of customary international 
law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  This 
provision has recently been used in relation to the suspension of supply of 
nuclear materials to Russia.42 
6.62 Finally, Article XIV provides for the termination of the proposed 
Agreement at 12 months’ notice, along with the potential to cease 
cooperation at an earlier date if this is deemed necessary.43  As discussed 
in a previous Chapter, ASNO raised the possibility of invoking Article XIV 
in the event that India resumed nuclear testing. 
39  Dr Floyd, DFAT, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 15 June 2015, p. 2. 
40  Mr Carlson, Submission 1, p. 23. 
41  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 5. 
42  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 5. 
43  ASNO, Submission 22, p. 5. 
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6.63 Another matter raised by participants to the inquiry was the lack of a 
provision permitting Australia to demand the return of its nuclear 
materials.  This is called a ‘right of return’ provision, and is common to 
most Australian nuclear cooperation agreements. 
6.64 The legality of right of return provisions was discussed at some length in 
the Committee’s Report on the Agreement between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Cooperation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.44 
6.65 John Carlson, one of a number of participants who expresses some 
concern over this issue,45  advises that: 
All our other agreements provide that, if there is a violation, we 
have the right to take back what we have supplied. How that 
would work in practice is another story, of course. I do not think 
we would be keen to take back spent fuel.46 
6.66 According to ASNO, energy security is at the heart of the reason a right of 
return is not included in the proposed Agreement.  The Indian 
Government is very concerned not to expose the country to a situation in 
which its electricity supply could be threatened by an exporting nation 
requiring the return of fuel.47 
6.67 India has only consented to a right of return in a single nuclear 
cooperation agreement – with the United States - and then only if the 
United States agreed to include substantial financial compensation 
provisions should the right of return be exercised.48 
6.68 Taking account of these considerations as well as the practical challenges 
if Australia had to accept the return of nuclear material, ASNO is not 
concerned that a right of return provision is not part of the proposed 
agreement.49 
44  Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), Report 137, tabled 
18 March 2014. 
45  See also for example Dr Jim Green, National Nuclear Campaigner, Friends of the Earth, 
Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 25. 
46  Mr Carlson, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 February 2015, p. 6. 
47  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 2. 
48  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 2. 
49  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 12 February 2015, p. 2. 
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Conflict with the Treaty of Rarotonga 
6.69 According to the Uniting Church of Australia Justice and International 
Commission, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, the proposed Agreement 
places Australia in possible breach of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga).  Article 3 of that Treaty states in 
part: 
Each Party undertakes: … 
 (c) not to take any action to assist or encourage the manufacture
or acquisition of any nuclear explosive device by any State.
6.70 Article 4 of that Treaty states: 
Each Party undertakes: 
 (a) not to provide source or special fissionable material, or
equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the
processing, use or production of special fissionable material for
peaceful purposes to:
⇒ (i) any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to the
safeguards required by Article III.1 of the NPT, or
⇒ (ii) any nuclear-weapon State unless subject to applicable
safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). Any such provision shall be in accordance
with strict non-proliferation measures to provide assurance
of exclusively peaceful non-explosive use;
 (b) to support the continued effectiveness of the international 
non-proliferation system based on the NPT and the IAEA
safeguards system. 50
6.71 The International Campaign against Nuclear Weapons (Australia) 
obtained legal advice by Australian National University’s 
Professor Don Rothwell.  Professor Rothwell’s advice: 
… was really very clear—that is, under the South Pacific nuclear
weapon free zone treaty, which Australia drove and was a 
founding state party of, nuclear commerce is only to be 
countenanced subject to the provisions of article 3 of the NPT. 
Section 2 of that article stipulates that with non-nuclear-armed 
states, nuclear commerce is only to be conducted when all of those 
nuclear facilities in those countries, in fact all of those subject to 
their jurisdiction, even if they are not completely within their 
territory, should be bound by safeguards applied by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency—that is, a comprehensive 
safeguards agreement. India does not have a comprehensive 
50  South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Rarotonga). 
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safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, and therefore Professor Rothwell's advice was that such 
an agreement would be clearly in breach of Australia's obligations 
under a treaty that it drove, that really has helped to underpin the 
strengthening of the commitment to nuclear disarmament and 
nonproliferation in the region, of which we are part. I think that 
legal advice is an important matter to put before this committee.51 
6.72 At the public hearing on 15 June 2015, the Committee asked 
Dr Robert Floyd in his capacity as the Director-General of ASNO if he had 
obtained external legal advice about the legality of the proposed 
Agreement, and if so, whether he was satisfied that the Agreement was 
consistent with Australia’s other legal obligations. 
6.73 Dr Floyd responded: 
I am satisfied that the advice we have received is that it is 
consistent with our legal obligations, and that advice comes from 
those who are expert in these matters. 52 
6.74 As discussed above in relation to reprocessing, the Committee is not in a 
position to make an informed judgement when experienced legal 
practitioners provide apparently contrary advice.  The Committee believes 
it would be prudent for the Government to anticipate a possible challenge 
to the proposed Agreement on the grounds that Australia has breached 
the provisions of the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
Conclusion 
6.75 The bulk of the issues relating to specific provisions in the proposed 
Agreement have been resolved to the Committee’s satisfaction. 
6.76 In particular, the Committee is as satisfied as it can be that Australian 
nuclear material will be tracked and accounted for in sufficient detail to 
prevent its legal use in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in India. 
6.77 In relation to the lack of right of return provisions, India’s reasons for 
wanting to retain nuclear materials are understandable.  In addition, 
should the proposed Agreement be terminated, the safeguards applying to 
Australian nuclear materials are required to remain in place.   
6.78 In relation to the issues arising from the consent provisions applying to 
refining Australian nuclear material and any conflict between the 
51  Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(Australia), Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 18 May 2015, p. 14. 
52  Dr Floyd, ASNO, Committee Hansard, 15 June 2015, p. 9. 
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proposed Agreement and the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Committee is not in 
a position to determine which of the two differing expert opinions in each 
is correct, and therefore the Committee can only advise the Australian 
Government that it may be prudent to expect a challenge to its view on 
these issues. 
6.79 India’s need for ongoing supplies of nuclear materials for energy security 
will, in the Committee’s view, reinforce its commitment to adhere to the 
provisions of the proposed Agreement. 
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7 
Concluding remarks 
7.1 The evidence presented before the Committee as part of this inquiry 
depicts an international community of specialists attempting to preserve a 
highly successful international framework of non-proliferation in a newly 
developing multi polar world.  The views expressed reflect the differing 
hopes and concerns of this community. 
7.2 The Committee has attempted to weave a path through the complex 
cartography of issues presented by the Agreement between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy (the proposed Agreement).  It has taken some time, and the 
Committee appreciates the cooperation and patience of the Australian 
Government and those who participated in the inquiry. 
7.3 It would be fair to say that, in this debate, there are no small risks or 
benefits.  Every issue the Committee has dealt with in this inquiry bears 
significant potential benefits and risks. 
7.4 To begin with, the quantum of uranium involved could easily double the 
size of the uranium mining industry in Australia, bringing significant 
export revenue, and business and employment opportunities at a time 
when commodity prices for other mining exports are slowing the pace of 
growth in Australia’s mining industry. 
7.5 For India, the significance of the proposed Agreement is possibly even 
greater.  As an emerging world power with a considerable shortfall of 
generating capacity, nuclear powered electricity generation will grow as 
one of a number of generating sources selected because of their low 
carbon emissions. 
7.6 The question for the Committee is, then, given the benefits for Australia 
and India from the proposed Agreement; can the risks be tolerated and 
ameliorated? 
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7.7 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is performing well in limiting 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  However, with India as an emerging 
world power the NPT faces a significant challenge.  The problem lies in 
the arbitrary date that separates those parties to the NPT who are nuclear 
weapons states and those who are not.  India is on the wrong side of that 
date. 
7.8 Forty years of isolation from the non-proliferation community have not 
prevented India from developing and deploying nuclear weapons. 
7.9 The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group has attempted to find a way to bring India 
into the non-proliferation mainstream by permitting the sale of uranium if 
India adopts the standards expected of nuclear armed states under the 
NPT. 
7.10 The bulk of signatories to the NPT appear to oppose this approach on the 
grounds that they have sacrificed the right to possess nuclear weapons in 
order to participate in the non-proliferation mainstream and benefit from 
access to nuclear generated electricity if they so wish.  This is a reasonable 
argument. 
7.11 The Committee believes that if signatories to the NPT are going to accept 
India back into the non-proliferation mainstream, the Indian Government 
is going to have to act expeditiously to prove its non-proliferation 
credentials as an emerging world power. 
7.12 To this end, the Committee has recommended the Australian Government 
consider facilitating the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty in 
the subcontinent region. 
7.13 For the Committee, the highest standard of safety in the use of Australian 
nuclear material is a central requirement for the export of that material. 
Should Australian nuclear material be sold to India, the Australian public 
will want to be assured that the nuclear material is being used safely.   
7.14 Recent examinations by a number of reputable institutions indicate that 
safety standards are not as high as they should be, particularly in the areas 
of the independence of the nuclear regulator, and the quality and quantity 
of safety inspections. 
7.15 Because of this, the Committee has recommended that Australian uranium 
not be sold to India until the Indian Government has established a nuclear 
regulator with statutory independence and safety inspections of Indian 
nuclear facilities that meet best practice standards. 
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7.16 In relation to the specific issues associated with the proposed Agreement 
itself, the bulk of these have been resolved to the Committee’s satisfaction.  
In particular, the Committee is as assured as it can be that Australian 
nuclear material will be tracked and accounted for, and so will not be 
diverted into military applications. 
7.17 On a couple of issues: the terminology used in the consent mechanism for 
the refinement of nuclear materials; and the question of whether the 
proposed Agreement breaches the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Committee is 
faced with opposing interpretations presented by very reputable sources. 
7.18 As the Committee has noted previously, it does not have the expertise, or 
the power, to determine which of these views is correct. In line with the 
Committee’s previous recommendation, the Committee recommends that 
the Australian Government outline the legal advice it has received in 
relation to the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
Recommendation 5 
7.19 The Committee recommends that the Australian Government outline 
the legal advice it has received concerning whether the proposed 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy breaches 
Australia’s obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone Treaty. 
7.20 Overall, the Committee believes that, conditional on the recommendations 
relating to nuclear safety, the proposed Agreement represents a prudent 
and balanced approach to dealing with the nuclear material needs of an 
emerging and energy hungry world power. 
7.21 The Committee also believes that the proposed Agreement will make a 
measurable contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
preventing damaging climate change into the future. 
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Recommendation 6 
7.22 Subject to the above recommendations, the Committee supports the 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and 
recommends that binding treaty action be taken. 
Mr Wyatt Roy MP 
Chair 
Additional Comments—The Hon Melissa Parke 
MP and Senator Sue Lines. 
As members of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), we endorse the 
cautious approach adopted by the majority of the committee in its report on the 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (New Delhi, 5 September 2014). 
However we consider that the Committee’s major concerns, including the full 
separation of India’s civil and military nuclear facilities and the establishment of 
an independent nuclear regulatory authority, are best addressed prior to 
ratification. The majority Committee view that these matters be addressed after 
ratification but prior to sale is positive in that it acknowledges the importance of 
this action before any future transfer of Australian uranium but this position is at 
risk of being overtaken by more narrow political and commercial priorities. The 
current Agreement is deficient and requires further attention to be strengthened to 
a standard consistent with both Australia’s other nuclear safeguards mechanisms 
and community expectations. With regard to other matters about which the 
majority Committee has expressed its satisfaction, such as the requirement for 
India to track and account for Australian nuclear material, we are not prepared to 
simply accept ASNO’s assurances; we would actually need to see the confidential 
administrative arrangement that it is claimed provides for such tracking and 
accounting.  
These Additional Comments thus reflect the deep unease we feel at the 
Agreement’s departure from the strong safeguards arrangements Australia has 
with many other countries.  
Summary Overview 
Australia’s uranium export policy dates back to the 1970s.  The principal objective 
of this policy is to ensure that Australian uranium and nuclear material derived 
from Australian uranium (known as Australian Obligated Nuclear Material – 
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AONM) is not used for nuclear weapons or any other military purpose and cannot 
contribute to any military purpose.  Until the proposed nuclear cooperation 
agreement with India (“the NCA”), this policy has been applied by successive 
governments on a bipartisan basis.  Australia’s nuclear supply conditions have 
been accepted by 41 countries, and are given effect through 23 nuclear cooperation 
agreements (the difference in these numbers is due mainly to the agreement with 
the European Union which covers 28 countries).   
Nuclear cooperation with India raises a number of major issues, including: 
1. India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Australia’s policy has been to require NPT membership for nuclear
supply to non-nuclear-weapon states.  Under the terms of the NPT
India does not qualify as a “nuclear-weapon state”, and therefore is
classed legally as a “non-nuclear-weapon state”.  India’s non-NPT
status is also an issue under the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone Treaty, which in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states limits
nuclear supply to NPT parties.  Since India has nuclear weapons, to
regard it as a non-nuclear-weapon state is a legal fiction. Serious
questions about the legality of the proposed sales action were raised
during the Committee’s investigations and we are concerned that the
proposed India NCA is in conflict with Australia’s obligations under
the SPNWFZ Treaty.
2. India is one of only three countries (the others are Pakistan and North
Korea) which are still producing nuclear material for nuclear weapons.
The NPT nuclear-weapon states ceased production of nuclear material
for nuclear weapons many years ago.
3. Directly relevant to the preceding point, the Committee received expert
testimony that India has not fully separated its military and civilian
nuclear programs, and has not placed all civilian facilities under IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards.  According to such
eminent experts as Mr John Carlson AM and Mr Ronald Walker, some
civilian facilities outside India’s safeguarded program appear to be
linked to its military program.
4. Also directly relevant to points 2) and 3), the Committee heard that
India’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA gives India the right to use
safeguarded nuclear material in facilities that are outside the
safeguarded program (and also to use unsafeguarded material in
safeguarded facilities).  This flexibility to use safeguarded material
outside the safeguarded program is not available to NPT nuclear-
weapon states; it is peculiar to India.
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5. It cannot be overlooked that in the past India has disregarded peaceful
use agreements.  The plutonium for its first nuclear test, in 1974, came
from the misuse of a reactor supplied by Canada (and using US-
supplied heavy water) under peaceful use agreements, and India
continued to use this reactor for its nuclear weapon program until the
reactor was closed in 2010.
6. The long standing nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan continues
to directly threaten regional security and peace. A new report by the 
US based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the 
Stimson Centre concludes that Pakistan is currently rapidly expanding 
its nuclear capabilities because of its fear of India. In such a volatile 
context it is imperative that the highest levels of scrutiny, assurance 
and transparency apply to any Australian fissile materials. 
Both Labor and the Coalition are committed to strengthening Australia’s bilateral 
relationship with India. In 2012 it was the Labor Gillard government that 
commenced the negotiation of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) 
with India. In this context, it is recognised that access to low carbon energy 
resources can make an important contribution to India’s economic and social 
development.  However, having regard to the circumstances outlined above, we 
consider it essential that any nuclear agreement with India should be at least as 
rigorous as all the agreements Australia has concluded with other countries.  
There is no justification for Australia to require less of India than of all our other 
agreement partners.  The Australian Labor Party Platform states: 
In relation to India, an important strategic partner for Australia, 
commitments and responsible actions in support of nuclear non-
proliferation, consistent with international guidelines on nuclear 
supply, will provide an acceptable basis for peaceful nuclear 
cooperation, including the export of uranium, subject to the 
application of strong safeguards.   (underlining added) 
The proposed NCA does not provide “strong safeguards” and undermines a bi-
partisan safeguards policy that has operated successfully for almost forty years.  
We are particularly concerned that the NCA in its present form fails to provide 
adequate assurance against the possible use of AONM to contribute to a military 
purpose.  
Specific areas of concern 
There were 23 submissions sent to the committee, or a total of 39 including 
supplementary submissions.  The great majority of submissions were critical of the 
proposed NCA, in particular about safeguards and legal aspects.  Especially 
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noteworthy were submissions critical of the details of the NCA from former senior 
safeguards, diplomatic and legal officials with unparalleled expertise in the issues 
involved. 
1 The NCA does not include right of return provisions if AONM is 
diverted for military purposes, or if the NCA is breached in some other 
way  
In every other NCA to which Australia is a party, successive governments have 
insisted on being able to demand the return of AONM that has been supplied 
under the agreement, should the recipient be found in breach of safeguards.  This 
critical provision ensures that those who illegally seek to proliferate nuclear 
weapons with the benefit of Australian-supplied material are not able to bank the 
gains already received once the illegal activity is discovered.  This treaty provision 
helps persuade recipient countries not to use AONM material to rush for nuclear 
weapons, since the benefits obtained through nuclear cooperation with Australia 
would be at risk. 
This NCA provides no right of return of supplied material in event of a breach of 
the NCA.  India has given a right of return to the US under the US-India 
agreement, however the Abbott government has failed to obtain this standard 
condition for Australia.   
Under this NCA, the testing of nuclear weapons by India does not violate the 
NCA.  Accordingly, it remains unclear what the Australian Government’s 
response would be to a resumption by India of nuclear weapons testing, and what 
legal basis Australia might have for suspending uranium supply in that 
circumstance. 
We feel that this could have grave consequences.  Under this NCA India could 
stockpile substantial quantities of AONM.  The failure to obtain a right of return 
means that if the NCA is suspended by Australia (following, for example, a 
resumption by India of nuclear weapons testing) that material would remain 
available for India’s use.  
The committee received testimony from the Australian Safeguards and Non-
Proliferation Office (ASNO).  ASNO did not provide any technical reason as to 
why this NCA does not include right of return provisions. 
We are not suggesting that India has any intention to use AONM in violation of 
the NCA, and we support in-principle the supply of uranium to India in 
accordance with our policy platform.  But a failure to obtain from India this 
completely standard provision means that a major disincentive to conduct further 
nuclear testing is lost as a direct result of the Government’s failure to insist on 
standard NCA provisions.  
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Recommendation: 
1. That the NCA not be ratified in its present form, but be amended,
either directly or through an exchange of letters, to expressly state
that Australia may require the return of AONM supplied under the NCA
should India be found in-breach of the NCA or its broader non-
proliferation undertakings with respect to India’s Nuclear Suppliers
Group exemption.
2 The NCA does not limit AONM to facilities under permanent 
IAEA safeguards  
India possesses a growing nuclear arsenal.  India is also producing fissile material 
for nuclear weapons.  To that end, some of India’s nuclear reactors are designated 
for civilian power production under safeguards, while others are for military 
purposes to produce bombs, and some may serve both purposes.  The committee 
heard that India has a “separation plan” under which it has designated 14 out of 
its current 22 power reactors, and some associated facilities, as “civilian” and 
placed them under permanent IAEA safeguards.  For the future, India reserves the 
right to decide which additional facilities, if any, it will place under safeguards.  
However, major parts of India’s civilian program – various power reactors, fast 
breeder reactors, enrichment facilities and reprocessing facilities – have not been 
designated as civilian.  These remain outside IAEA safeguards and evidently will 
remain so in the future.  Thus India operates a number of unsafeguarded facilities, 
some of which are civilian, some military, and some that appear to be both. 
According to eminent experts, this incomplete separation of India’s civilian and 
military programs is problematic because India’s safeguards agreement with the 
IAEA (“the IAEA agreement”) allows India to move nuclear material that is 
subject to safeguards requirements (such as AONM) between its safeguarded and 
unsafeguarded programs, and vice versa.  The IAEA agreement sets out two 
different safeguards regimes within India: 
1. Permanent safeguards for facilities that have been designated as
“civilian” under India’s separation plan.  These facilities are listed in
the Annex to the IAEA agreement.
2. All other nuclear facilities in India are normally outside IAEA 
safeguards.  Such a facility will become subject to safeguards on
a temporary basis if India decides to use safeguarded material in that
facility.  The facility will be subject to safeguards while nuclear material
subject to safeguards requirements remains there.
3. In the case of facilities safeguarded on a temporary basis, the IAEA 
agreement has special provisions, for example allowing India to use
safeguarded and unsafeguarded material together, and in particular
circumstances to remove from safeguards nuclear material that has
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been produced using safeguarded material.  For instance, India can use 
safeguarded uranium to produce plutonium which it can then remove 
from safeguards. 
The NCA provides that IAEA safeguards apply to AONM in accordance with the 
IAEA agreement.  As just discussed, the IAEA agreement allows India to use 
safeguarded material in facilities that are outside India’s safeguarded program.  It 
follows that AONM could be so used to contribute to the production of 
unsafeguarded nuclear material – the NCA does not exclude this.   
ASNO noted that both the IAEA agreement and the NCA proscribe use of 
safeguarded material to further any military purpose.  However ASNO was 
unable to explain how, once India exercises its right to remove material from 
safeguards, either the IAEA or Australia would be in a position to verify whether 
that material ends up being used for a military purpose.   
ASNO’s evidence on this point was inconsistent.  ASNO’s submission of 2 March 
2015 stated that AONM cannot be used in India’s unsafeguarded reactors.  At the 
Committee’s hearing on 15 June 2015 ASNO was asked to substantiate this 
statement but did not do so.  When asked whether Australia specifically asked 
India for AONM to be used only in facilities that are part of India's safeguarded 
program, ASNO said only that “AONM will only ever be used in facilities that are 
safeguarded.” 
This response is ambiguous, and avoids addressing the concerns raised by experts 
such as Mr Carlson.  ASNO’s use of the term “safeguarded” in this way confuses 
the issue by failing to distinguish between (a) facilities that are subject 
to permanent safeguards because they are designated as “civilian”, and (b) 
facilities that are only temporarily safeguarded because India has transferred 
safeguarded material to them  
Accordingly, we conclude that in its present form the NCA fails to ensure that 
AONM cannot be used to further any military purpose.   
This issue should be rectified by expressly providing that AONM can be used only 
in facilities that are under permanent IAEA safeguards, namely, facilities that are 
listed in the Annex to the IAEA agreement.  If India’s intention is to use AONM 
only in facilities that are under permanent IAEA safeguards, it should have no 
objection to confirming this.  On the other hand, if India’s intention is to be able to 
use AONM in facilities that are not under permanent safeguards, we consider that 
the NCA is fatally flawed and should not proceed. 
If the NCA proceeds without being amended to limit AONM to permanently 
safeguarded facilities, we consider that supply of AONM for India should be 
approved only for uranium that is enriched and fabricated into fuel assemblies in 
the United States and is transferred to India under the US-India nuclear 
cooperation agreement.  The US, by supplying India only with fuel assemblies for 
specific reactors, should be able to ensure that US-obligated nuclear material 
(which would include AONM supplied to India after enrichment and fabrication 
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in the US) is limited to facilities that are permanently safeguarded.  Australian 
uranium should not be supplied directly to India. 
Recommendations: 
2. That the NCA not be ratified in its present form, but be amended,
either directly or through an exchange of letters, to expressly state
that AONM can be used only in facilities that are under permanent
IAEA safeguards, that is, facilities that are listed in the Annex to the
IAEA agreement.
3. If the NCA is not amended in accordance with Recommendation 1,
that supply of AONM for India be approved only for uranium that is
enriched and fabricated into fuel assemblies in the United States and
transferred to India under the US-India nuclear cooperation
agreement.
3 The NCA’s consent provisions for reprocessing and high 
enrichment are ambiguous 
Retention of consent rights over reprocessing and high enrichment are essential 
elements in Australia’s nuclear export policy.  The NCA’s provisions on consent 
rights, in their present form, are at best ambiguous.  Mr Ernst Willheim, formerly 
one of the Commonwealth’s most senior law officers, made a submission to the 
committee in which he stated that as currently drafted these provisions are legally 
unacceptable.   
In evidence to the committee, officials did not specifically address Mr Willheim’s 
submission, saying only that there is no difference between Australia and India 
about the meaning of the provisions.  In view of Mr Willheim’s legal eminence, we 
consider his opinion should be taken very seriously.  The committee might 
reasonably have expected officials to refer Mr Willheim’s opinion to senior legal 
advisers, and to confirm, or otherwise, to the committee that after specifically 
considering Mr Willheim’s opinion the Commonwealth’s legal view remains that 
the drafting of the NCA is satisfactory.   
Recommendation: 
4. That the NCA not be ratified in its present form without addressing
concerns about the ambiguity of the consent provisions.  Preferably
this would be through amending the text, but at the least India should
be asked to join in a clarifying statement to put beyond doubt that the
two parties do share a common understanding of the meaning of the
text.
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4 The NCA does not give Australia programmatic consent rights 
for reprocessing 
Nuclear weapons require Uranium–235 or Plutonium–239.  To produce these 
isotopes in the necessary purity for a nuclear bomb a would-be proliferator must 
either ‘enrich’ natural uranium by separating out the fissile isotope Uranium–235 
from the Uranium–238 that is predominant in natural uranium, or breed 
plutonium by adding neutrons to Uranium-238 through irradiation of fuel in a 
reactor and then chemically separating the fissile Plutonium–239 from the spent 
fuel.  The separation of plutonium from spent fuel is known as ‘reprocessing’.  
Reprocessing enables the recycling of plutonium for use in another reactor but it 
can also serve as a pathway to a bomb.  Obviously, reprocessing is a highly 
sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle owing to the risk of diverting plutonium 
for nuclear weapons. 
An essential aspect of Australian policy on reprocessing is that hitherto consent 
has been given only on a “programmatic” basis.  This means that reprocessing and 
use of plutonium can take place only under a fuel cycle program agreed by both 
parties – Australian approval is required for the specific facilities using, handling 
or storing plutonium, and the purposes involved.  To date Australia has given 
consent to reprocess only to Japan and the European Union (the latter covering 
reprocessing facilities in UK and France), and only for a mutually determined 
program. 
The NCA however gives reprocessing consent without Australia having any say 
about the facilities that will use the plutonium.  Effectively the NCA outsources 
Australia’s consent to the US – India can reprocess AONM and use the recovered 
plutonium provided this is in accordance with the US-India reprocessing 
arrangements.  The US does not have an equivalent to programmatic consent – so 
in this NCA Australia relinquishes any say in how India can use Australian-
obligated plutonium; the only requirement is that the plutonium must be under 
IAEA safeguards (which in itself is not sufficient, given the flexibility available to 
India under the IAEA agreement, as discussed above). 
To be consistent with established Australian policy, the consent provisions in the 
NCA should provide for programmatic consent. 
Recommendation: 
5. That the NCA be amended, directly or through an exchange of letters,
to provide for Australian-obligated plutonium to be used only in
accordance with a fuel cycle program mutually determined by India
and Australia.
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5 It appears India is not prepared to undertake accounting for and 
tracking of AONM in accordance with international practice 
Accounting for and tracking of AONM are fundamental requirements of 
Australian policy and legislation (Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987).  
The NCA cannot be implemented if AONM cannot be identified and quantified.  
The NCA requires each party to establish an accounting system for nuclear 
material subject to the agreement.  Details are to be in an administrative 
arrangement concluded by ASNO and its Indian counterpart.  The administrative 
arrangement is confidential, so the text is not available to the committee or the 
public. 
Evidence to the committee, not disputed by officials, suggested that Indian 
officials have had difficulties in agreeing to provide accounting and tracking 
information for AONM.  The committee was informed that Indian officials had 
similarly refused to provide accounting and tracking information to the US – as a 
consequence, the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement, which was concluded 
in 2007, has still not become operational.  The committee was further informed 
that earlier in 2015 Indian and US officials had finally reached a pragmatic 
solution.   
Critically, the US would provide nuclear material in the form of fuel assemblies 
for US-supplied reactors – the material would stay in a self-contained US fuel 
cycle within the overall Indian fuel cycle. India would provide detailed 
operational information on the reactors to enable US officials to calculate 
plutonium production (which would be subject to the US-India agreement). 
Australia does not produce fuel assemblies, so cannot export AONM to India in 
that form, and the operational information that India chooses to provide to 
Australia has not been publicly disclosed.   
The committee was informed in evidence that the established international 
practice, applied by every country that receives nuclear material under bilateral 
agreements except India, is to add a bilateral accounting function to the nuclear 
accounting system that the country operates under its IAEA safeguards 
agreement.  Individual batches of nuclear material are linked to the relevant 
bilateral agreement through inclusion of a country code on IAEA accounting 
forms.  The committee was informed that with modern nuclear accounting 
software it is very straightforward to track the batches of material that are subject 
to each agreement.   
The committee was further informed that the attitude of Indian officials towards 
accounting and tracking may be due in part to India currently having only a 
simplified form of safeguards accounting, based on its old IAEA agreement.  It is 
understood the IAEA is currently working with India to introduce a modern 
accounting system, to ensure that the IAEA can identify material required by 
bilateral agreements to be safeguarded.  The committee was informed that the new 
accounting system could be used to identify the material that is subject to each 
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particular agreement.  It is to be hoped that as Indian officials gain proficiency 
with the new system they will reconsider their opposition to tracking bilaterally 
obligated material. 
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether the administrative arrangement will 
meet Australian requirements.  Since the administrative arrangement is 
confidential it is difficult for the Parliament and the public to have confidence in 
the outcome, although we note the assurance of Dr Robert Floyd in a committee 
hearing on 15 June 2015 that he is satisfied he will be able to comply with his 
reporting requirements as per the Safeguards Act.   
We do not consider it satisfactory that a matter of such importance to Australia’s 
safeguards policy is contained solely in an administrative arrangement that 
neither the public nor the committee is allowed to see.  
Evidence to the committee was that the pragmatic approach reached between the 
US and India is workable because of the limited scope of the nuclear material 
involved – fuel assemblies for US-supplied reactors are readily identifiable and 
tracked.  It is difficult to see how the same approach could work if Australian 
uranium was supplied directly to India as bulk material.  
Recommendations: 
6. That AONM not be supplied directly to India until Indian officials are
following established international practice with regard to accounting
for and tracking AONM.
7. Meanwhile, until Indian officials are following established international
practice with regard to accounting for and tracking AONM, that supply
of AONM for India be approved only for uranium that is enriched and
fabricated into fuel assemblies in the US in accordance with
Recommendation 2.
8. That JSCOT Committee members be provided with access to the
administrative arrangements in order to satisfy the legitimate public
interest concerns around the adequacy of the accounting and
monitoring mechanisms prior to any Treaty ratification.
6 The NCA does not give Australia the right to the IAEA’s 
safeguards findings with respect to AONM 
A standard provision in Australia’s other nuclear cooperation agreements is for 
Australia to have access to the IAEA’s safeguards conclusions with respect to 
material subject to the particular agreement.  This NCA has no such provision.  
The committee heard that in the absence of such a provision, the IAEA is required 
to treat all country-specific safeguards information as confidential to India.  
Australia has no right to IAEA reports relating to AONM in India, nor even to 
ascertain whether India is meeting IAEA accounting requirements.   
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India’s agreements with the US and Canada do provide access to IAEA reports on 
the status of their material.  It is not clear why this has been omitted from this 
NCA.   
Recommendation: 
9. That the NCA be amended, directly or through an exchange of letters,
to give Australia the right to request the IAEA’s safeguards findings or 
conclusions for India as they relate to AONM. 
7 This NCA undermines nuclear arms control and weakens 
Australia’s non-proliferation credentials.   
India has not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).  India 
maintains a unilateral moratorium against nuclear testing, but is free to change 
this position at any time.  By contrast, China and the United States have signed the 
CTBT, and pending ratification are legally obligated not to act inconsistently with 
the Treaty; that is, not to test.  India has no such obligation.  India’s refusal to sign 
the CTBT makes it unique among Australia’s current nuclear cooperation partners, 
and this must be interpreted as an intention by India to maintain the option to 
recommence nuclear weapons testing in the future.  
The committee heard that of these three nations (China, the United States and 
India), India has the strongest incentive to abrogate its moratorium and resume 
nuclear testing.  This is because India has not successfully detonated a 
thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb, and because of the ongoing and intensifying 
strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region.  Accordingly, concerns remain 
within India as to the reliability of its strategic deterrent relative to potential rivals. 
Without further nuclear testing by India, some feel these security concerns will not 
be resolved. 
Australia’s long-standing policy has been that since nuclear material can be used 
to create weapons of indiscriminate horror, the export of such material can be 
justified only where doing so helps to restrict the spread of such weapons.  This 
NCA remains completely silent on India’s future nuclear restraint or willingness 
to join the CTBT.  There is no evidence that India intends to curtail or restrict the 
expansion of its nuclear weapons program in any way.  
One of the strongest arguments in favour of concluding a nuclear cooperation 
agreement with India is that it brings India ‘into the tent’ with regard to 
international nuclear non-proliferation rules and norms.  Far from achieving this 
outcome, this NCA entrenches India’s nuclear deviance and privileges it ahead of 
Australia’s other nuclear cooperation partners, thereby undermining the non-
proliferation regime as a whole.  We strongly believe that an undertaking by India 
to act in accordance with accepted non-proliferation norms comparable to other 
nuclear-armed states is an essential criterion for Australian nuclear supply. 
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Recommendation: 
10. That prior to effect being given to the NCA, clarification is received
from India as to its willingness to comply with non-proliferation norms
and the exercising of nuclear restraint.  A positive example would be
for India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, with
confirmation it will ratify soon after the United States and/or China.
This does not place restrictions on India’s nuclear weapons program
unilaterally, while still providing assurance to Australia and the world
that India will respond reciprocally to steps taken by other nuclear-
armed states.
The NCA contains other problem areas. 
These include: 
1. While the NCA states that AONM is to be subject to India’s safeguards
additional protocol with the IAEA, in fact India’s additional protocol
does not apply to any nuclear material in India.  The IAEA’s additional
protocol was introduced to strengthen safeguards.  Australia’s policy
makes the conclusion of an additional protocol a condition for uranium
supply.  However, according to experts, India has concluded a very
limited additional protocol – by far the most restrictive of any country.
This is an additional protocol in name but does not meet the intent of
Australia’s policy.
2. The NCA’s fallback safeguards provisions fall well short of Australia’s
other agreements.  Australia’s standard condition is that, if for any
reason IAEA safeguards cease to apply, the parties are to establish
safeguards arrangements that conform to IAEA safeguards principles
and procedures and provide equivalent assurance.  This NCA requires
only that the parties consult and agree on “appropriate verification
measures”, a vague term open to differing interpretations.
3. The NCA has no mandatory dispute settlement provision.  Australia’s
standard condition is for disputes to be settled by negotiation, but with
an arbitration process in case negotiations fail.  This NCA provides only
for negotiation.  This leaves Australia potentially in a weak position,
especially as the shortcomings in the NCA, together with the problem
areas in India’s IAEA agreement, create ample possibilities for dispute.
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS – THE HON MELISSA PARKE AND SENATOR SUE LINES 75 
Conclusion 
As members of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), we cannot 
support the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the 
Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy 
(New Delhi, 5 September 2014) in its present form.   
We view the current NCA as a flawed instrument that fails to either provide 
industry certainty or advance non-proliferation. 
We believe renegotiation is required to resolve the issues we have raised in these 
Additional Comments - issues that have all been identified as unresolved concerns 
by the majority Committee. This strengthening could be realised either through 
amending the text or through an exchange of letters clarifying the text and the 
shared understanding and intent of the Parties.   
These are all serious issues that if not resolved could have adverse consequences 
for Australia’s ability to ensure that Australian Obligated Nuclear Material cannot 
contribute to any military purpose. If not resolved there could be adverse 
consequences for public confidence in the NCA and for the preparedness of future 
governments to approve supply of nuclear material under the NCA. There is also 
the potential for damage to Australia’s international reputation and credibility as a 
proponent of nuclear non-proliferation and a strong upholder of nuclear 
safeguards.  
The Hon Melissa Parke MP 
Senator Sue Lines 
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Additional Comments—Australian Greens. 
The Australian Greens acknowledge the work and analysis in the Committee 
report and support the Committee’s view that uranium not be sold to India at this 
time. 
However, despite this prudent finding, the Australian Greens believe the 
Committee report fails to adequately address other risks and deficiencies in the 
proposed Agreement. These include: 
 the Agreement is inconsistent with Australia’s treaty obligations and
undermines international law and established standards;
 the Agreement undermines global nuclear non-proliferation efforts and
destabilises the international non-proliferation architecture; and
 the Agreement erodes the independence and effectiveness of the
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO).
The Report acknowledges some of these defects but does not require these issues 
to be resolved before the Agreement is ratified. The magnitude of these issues is 
underscored by evidence that the Committee received from former top-ranking 
officials in the Australian and international nuclear sector warning against the 
Agreement. 
Nevertheless, the Committee report is in no way a green-light for the sale of 
yellowcake to India. The Committee report clearly recommends that no sales to 
India be permitted until a set of detailed preconditions are met. The committee 
report states that: 
Australian uranium not be sold to India until the Indian 
Government has established a nuclear regulator with statutory 
independence and safety inspections of Indian nuclear facilities 
that meet best practice standards. 
Irrespective, the Agreement is fundamentally inconsistent with both domestic and 
international obligations and puts short term political expedience above global 
security. As such, the Australian Greens cannot support this Agreement and urge 
others to do likewise. 
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Recommendation 1: 
The Australia-India Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement not 
proceed. 
The benefits for Australia and India 
The commercial interests of a small and marginal industry sector must not be 
prioritised over global security concerns and Australia’s international reputation. 
The Australian Greens dispute the Committee’s acceptance of industry-sourced 
data on the value and importance of Australia’s uranium sector. The sector 
remains a small employer and shrinking contributor to the economy. 
The Australian Greens reject the false dichotomy that India must choose between 
nuclear and coal to meet future energy requirements; and instead note India’s 
planned $200 billion investment in renewable energy. The Australian Greens 
strongly believe that India’s energy future should be renewable not radioactive, 
and that Australia is well placed to assist in this respect. 
The Agreement 
The Agreement is inconsistent with Section 51(2) and 70(1) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987; and Article IV of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free 
Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) which Australia is legally obliged to uphold 
under Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
The Committee has concluded that it is not in a position to make an “informed 
judgement” on such issues; but anticipates a challenge to the proposed agreement 
“on the grounds that Australia has breached the provisions of the Treaty of 
Rarotonga.” This uncertainty alone should be enough to defer ratification of the 
Agreement. 
Further concerns about the legality of the Agreement were highlighted in a 
number of submissions to the inquiry, particularly those by the former Director 
General of ASNO John Carlson; and the former Chair of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, Ron Walker. The gravity of the legal 
deficiencies and subsequent proliferation risk is clearly articulated in comments 
made by Mr Carlson: 
It is understood Indian officials say they will not account for 
AONM [Australian obligated nuclear material], they will not do 
more than maintain IAEA accounts, because they say tracking 
AONM is expensive, complicated and unnecessary: 
I. the first objections are not true — AONM can be tracked simply 
by adding a two-or three-letter code to IAEA accounting forms, 
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this is the standard practice in all Australian partner countries 
(e.g. the code for Australia is “AU” or “AUS”. The entries for 
AONM are readily aggregated by the accounting software in 
use today; 
II. as to whether tracking is necessary this is not a matter for
debate, it is a legal requirement — Article III.5 requires that it 
be done. 
Essentially, Indian officials seem to be saying, before the 
agreement even enters into force that India has no intention of 
complying with Article III.5. If Australian officials, in the 
negotiation of the administrative arrangement, accept India’s 
refusal to track AONM, they will be acquiescing in the 
contravention of the agreement.” 
ASNO is responsible for implementing Australian safeguards agreements and 
ensuring they are consistent with statutory obligations. As noted, this Agreement 
is not consistent with the existing Safeguards Act. This puts into question ASNO’s 
independence and ability to function within the law. This Agreement allows India 
to operate outside the law and reduces the legitimacy of Australian agencies 
wishing to enforce the law. 
Recommendation 2: 
The Australian Government should make public in full its legal advice 
on the compliance of the Agreement with obligations under the Treaty 
of Rarotonga. 
Nuclear non-proliferation 
The Committee report has clearly identified nuclear weapons proliferation risks 
with India and the role Australia could play in negotiating a nuclear arms 
limitations treaty; promoting the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
and advancing a fissile material cut-off treaty. The Committee also outlines the 
need for an independent regulator in India and the need for assurance from the 
IAEA that site inspections will be best practice. 
The Committee rightly concludes that “nuclear cooperation with India is probably 
the biggest issue in nuclear non-proliferation for some decades”; and “that nuclear 
cooperation with India is opposed by the bulk of signatories to the NPT [Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty] and may destabilise the international non-proliferation 
architecture.” 
India continues to expand its nuclear weapons program; is not a signatory to the 
NPT; and refuses to sign the CTBT. This indicates a complete disregard for 
Australian safeguards and international treaties. 
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As it stands, the Agreement tacitly endorses this behaviour. If Australia were to 
ratify the Agreement in its current form it would set an extremely dangerous 
precedent; would send the wrong message to purchasers of uranium; and would 
be out-of-step with international opinion. 
The global risk of nuclear weapons production by India was identified in a 
resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council in 1998, which 
“encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology 
that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons”. 
Again, Mr Carlson provides a succinct description of the link between Australian 
uranium sales and the threat of nuclear weapons production: 
The nuclear material under this agreement will be usable for 
nuclear purposes for hundreds, if not thousands, of years. The 
material can undergo a number of recycling operations, producing 
further plutonium each time. Within the first decade or two there 
could be tonnes of plutonium derived from Australian uranium 
that would be well beyond any information available to Australia. 
The same situation applies to the uranium recovered from 
reprocessing, most of which could be recycled many times. 
Without a proper accounting system, once material loses its initial 
identity, there is no way of knowing where that material goes, or 
even quantifying it. There is no substitute or “equivalent” for 
accounting and tracking. 
Mr Walker wrote to the Committee in May 2015 warning that that the Agreement 
“has a number of loopholes which mean that under the terms of the NCA India 
could use our uranium in the production of material that could end up in bombs.” 
ASNO itself has conceded that “such a hypothetical situation could occur.” This 
situation is worsened because the checks and balances in relation to enrichment 
and reprocessing are deficient. 
India’s nuclear weapons ambitions are not only a collection of external 
observations and speculation. K. Subrahmanyam, former head of the National 
Security Advisory Board in India, said in 2005: 
Given India’s uranium ore crunch and the need to build up our 
nuclear deterrent arsenal as fast as possible, it is to India’s 
advantage to categorise as many power reactors as possible as 
civilian ones to be re-fuelled by imported uranium and conserve 
our native uranium fuel for weapons-grade plutonium 
production’. Clearly, Australian uranium would boost India’s 
nuclear weapons capacity. 
India’s nuclear weapons ambitions are exacerbated not only by the extended 
conflict with Pakistan, but also because of strained relations with China which 
Indian officials consider as their “primary adversary”, as noted by Mr Carlson. 
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Approving the Agreement would indicate that Australia does not take 
international treaties seriously, or our own safeguards, laws and regulatory 
bodies; and that Australian is willing to put relations with one country above 
nuclear non-proliferation. The NPT has already been systematically weakened by 
other agreements that are stronger than this Agreement. In its current form, this 
Agreement would further erode the effectiveness of nuclear non-proliferation 
efforts to the detriment of global security. 
Nuclear safety in India 
Selling uranium to India not only fuels the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation 
but also fuels an industry described by independent Indian analysts as 
substandard. The Australian Greens share the Committee’s view that “the 
Australian Government cannot overlook such clear warnings about the quality of 
India’s nuclear regulatory framework.” 
Australian uranium was sold to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and 
fuelled the continuing Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear crisis. The fact that this 
happened in what the Committee describes as the “apparently robust 
environment” of Japan bodes poorly for the far less regulated Indian sector. 
In 2012 the Indian Auditor General released a report warning against a disaster at 
an Indian reactor. The report identified that more than 60% of inspections of 
operating or existing nuclear reactors are up to five months late or do not occur at 
all. The report said India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board is ineffective, mired 
in bureaucracy and negligent in monitoring safety. There have been numerous 
reports of workers’ exposure to radiation through leaks and contaminated water. 
Other reports include incidents of uranium being stolen and unaccounted for. 
Senator Peter Whish-Wilson 
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Appendix A–Submissions 
Treaty tabled on 28 October 2014 
1 Mr John Carlson 
1.1 Mr John Carlson 
1.2 Mr John Carlson 
1.3 Mr John Carlson 
1.4 Mr John Carlson 
1.5 Mr John Carlson 
2 Mr Crispin Rovere 
2.1 Mr Crispin Rovere 
3 Ms Michele Madigan 
4 Mr Roma J O'Callaghan 
5 Australian Conservation Foundation 
6 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.1 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.2 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.3 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.4 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.5 Mr Ronald Walker 
6.6 Mr Ronald Walker 
7 M V Ramana 
8 Justice & International Mission, Uniting Church in Australia 
9 Minerals Council of Australia 
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10 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Australia) 
10.1 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Australia) 
11 Kalman A Robertson 
12 Gundjeihmi Aboriginal Corporation  
13 Professor Lawrence Scheinman 
13.1 Professor Lawrence Scheinman 
14 Friends of the Earth Australia 
15 Mr Bruce Jacobssen 
16 Mr Tom Bond 
17 Toro Energy Limited 
18 South Australian Chamber of Mines and Energy 
19 The Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia  
20 BHP Billiton 
21 Rio Tinto Services Limited 
22 Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
22.1 Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
23 Mr Ernst Willheim 
23.1 Mr Ernst Willheim 
B 
Appendix B–Witnesses 
Monday, 9 February—Canberra 
Minerals Council of Australia 
Dr Vanessa Guthrie, Board Member 
Mr Daniel Zavattiero, Executive Director – Uranium 
Individuals 
Mr John Carlson, 
Mr Ronald Walker 
Thursday, 12 February—Canberra 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency 
Dr Carl-Magnus Larsson, Chief Executive Officer 
Mr David Tredinnick, Director, Government and External Relations, Office 
of the CEO 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Mr Malcolm Coxhead, Director, CTBT and Disarmament Section, 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Dr Craig Everton, Director, IAEA Safeguards Section, Australian 
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-
Proliferation Office 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Mr Greg French, Assistant Secretary, International Legal Branch, Legal 
Division 
Mr David Mason, Executive Director, Treaty Secretariat 
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Department of Industry and Science 
Mr Michael Sheldrick, General Manager, Uranium and R&E International 
Branch, Resources Division 
Monday, 18 May—Melbourne 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Mr Dave Sweeney, Nuclear-Free Campaigner 
Friends of the Earth, Australia 
Dr Jim Green, National Nuclear Campaigner 
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Australia 
Associate Professor Tilman Ruff, Committee Member 
Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania 
Dr Mark Zirnsak, Director, Justice and International Mission Unit 
Monday, 15 June—Canberra 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency 
Professor Peter Johnston, Chief Medical Radiation Scientist, Medical 
Radiation Services Branch 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Mr Malcolm Coxhead, Director, CTBT and Disarmament Section, 
Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Dr Craig Everton, Director, IAEA Safeguards Section, Australian 
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office 
Dr Robert Floyd, Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-
Proliferation Office 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Mr Bryce Hutchesson, Acting First Assistant Secretary, South and West 
Asia Division 
Mr David Mason, Executive Director, Treaty Secretariat 
Mrs Stacey Nation, Legal Division, International Legal Branch, 
International Law Section 
Department of Industry and Science 
Mr Joshua Reakes, Manager, Uranium and R&E International Branch, 
Resources Division 
